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Abstract 
The foreign exchange market in Ghana prior to the economic reform 
process was characterised by three major features, namely, an excessively 
overvalued official exchange rate; a thriving black foreign exchange market; 
and an allocation of official foreign exchange based on import licensing 
arrangement issued by an Import Programming and Monitoring Committee. In 
order to rationalize the official exchange rate, absorb the parallel sub-market 
into the legal market, allow the forces of demand and supply to determine the 
rate and allocation of foreign exchange, and to achieve a convergence of the 
official and parallel rates, the Government adopted a series of exchange reform 
measures. Initially, the cedi was devalued in stages, followed by the use of 
purchasing power parity rule in determining exchange rate on quarterly basis 
for about three years. Later a weekly auction based on the Dutch auction 
system was introduced with two windows and later merged into one window. 
The import licensing arrangement was abolished. The Dutch auction system 
was utilized for about 6 years (on retail basis for 4 years and wholesale for 2 
years). Also, foreign exchange bureaux were established to legalize the parallel 
market operations. Despite the foreign exchange support from several 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, as well as the extensive institutional reform, 
and a stable macroeconomic environment, the convergence of the auction and 
the bureaux rates took over 5 years to achieve. 
I Introduction and theoretical frame 
Introduction 
The centrepiece of the economic reform programme (ERP) in Ghana is the 
realignment of the foreign exchange market and trade liberalization. This study 
of reform in the foreign exchange market in Ghana is in five parts: first, we 
highlight exchange rate policy before the adoption of the ERP in 1983, and we 
follow this with an exposition of the multiple exchange rate system from April 
1983 to January 1986. Third, we discuss the dual exchange regime in a retail 
auction market based on the Dutch auction system (DAS) and then describe 
the DAS arrangement prior to the establishment of foreign exchange bureaux 
in April 1988. Fourth, the merger of the official auction and bureau markets 
is discussed. Finally, we address the wholesale and interbank system in Ghana. 
Apart from two devaluations and one revaluation, the exchange rate was 
rigidly fixed between 1967 and 1983. Consequently, the cedi was excessively 
overvalued, as indicated by a divergence of over 4,264 per cent at the end of 
1982 from less than 8 per cent in 1967. In order to align the highly overvalued 
cedi, relieve the shortage of foreign exchange and reduce the size of the 
parallel exchange market, the government devalued the cedi in phases from 
C2.75: $1.00 in April 1983 to C90.00: $1.00 by the third quarter of 1986. 
These devaluations proceeded side-by-side with the liberalization of the 
trade sector and adoption of prudent monetary and fiscal policies. The overall 
impact of the series of devaluations was the narrowing of the divergence to 
102 per cent at the end of September 1986. 
Between October 1983 and 16 September 1986, all foreign exchange 
transactions operated under only one window, Window 1. On 16 September 
1986, Window 2 was introduced marking the beginning of an independent 
floating mechanism considered the best way of depoliticizing the issue of 
exchange rate adjustment. The Window 1 exchange rate was fixed at C90.00: 
$1.00, while the Window 2 rate was determined in the new weekly auction 
system conducted by the Bank of Ghana (BOG). The transactions through 
Window 1 covered imports of petroleum products and essential drugs, while 
Window 2 covered other transactions. The surrender of exchange earnings to 
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the BOG also corresponded to the duality of the exchange rates; earnings from 
exports of cocoa and residual oil products were surrendered at Window 1 and 
other transactions through Window 2. On 20 February 1987 Window 1 was 
abolished. 
The retail nature of the auction system is underlined by the fact that 
authorized dealer banks played only an intermediary role and that auctioning 
of foreign exchange was to final users only. In the event, the official or 
marginal rate was depreciated from C128.00: $1.00 at the first auction on 19 
September 1986 to C152.00: $1.00 at the fourteenth auction on 19 December 
1986. The premium of the parallel exchange rate over the marginal rate 
declined from 41 per cent on the first auction to 20 per cent on the fourteenth 
auction (at the end of December 1986). 
The first auction was based on the marginal pricing auction system (MPAS) 
in the determination of the exchange rate, in which case all the successful 
bidders paid the marginal price. But as from the second auction, DAS was 
adopted. Under DAS, all successful bidders paid the bid price and those whose 
bid prices were equal to the market-clearing (marginal) rate received a pro-
rated amount of the remaining foreign exchange. The marginal rate declared 
on the auction day (until a new rate was announced) applied to all extra-
auction transactions, such as all foreign exchange bought by BOG, allocated 
to the central Government and other public entities outside the auction, and 
sold to commercial banks to replenish their working balances. 
Following the abolition of Window 1, several categories of imports formerly 
excluded from bidding on the auction became eligible. A reclassification of the 
import licences was effected from 1987, while existing restrictions on the 
demand side of foreign exchange were removed. Eventually, on 14 January 
1989, the import licensing system was abolished. During the same period, the 
retention scheme was also modified to increase the supply of foreign exchange 
to the auction and to reduce foreign exchange being held in retention accounts. 
The auction system had four main objectives, and various modifications were 
implemented between 1987 and 1989. They were intended to achieve an 
increased supply in foreign exchange to match increased demand, a reduction 
in the weekly variation of the exchange rate, a decrease in the spread between 
the highest and lowest bid rates, and a narrowing of the divergence between 
the auction and the parallel/bureau rates. 
The auction market in Ghana has performed erratically given the supportive 
institutional arrangements and foreign exchange assistance from which it has 
benefitted. It has also taken longer than anticipated for the realization of the 
objectives (taking more than 210 auctions spanning 3.25 years of auctioning 
and seven years of exchange rate and trade stabilization). Despite all this, 
however, there were many positive developments. For example, the premium 
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of the parallel rate over the official exchange rate fell from 24.5 per cent in 
1986 to 3.32 per cent in 1990. 
The key practical objectives in the move to liberalize and stabilize the 
exchange rate and trade regime of Ghana were finally accomplished by the 
legalization of the parallel market on 1 February 1988, with the first bureau 
becoming operative on 8 April 1988. Nevertheless, despite the modifications 
in, and institutional rearrangements for, the implementation of foreign 
exchange auctions, divergence between the marginal and parallel rates widened 
from 24.45 per cent in 1986 to 32.12 per cent in 1987 as a parallel foreign 
exchange market continued to thrive. 
The co-existence of a parallel market, especially with a substantial 
divergence between parallel and official rates, is indicative of a basic 
disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market and trade regime. The key 
objectives behind the institutionalization of the bureaux are to eliminate the 
parallel market, capture the main market forces directly behind the 
determination of the cedi-dollar rate, and to absorb the bureau/parallel market 
into a single foreign exchange market. Despite the wide gap between the 
auction and the bureau exchange rates, the latter was closer to the parallel rate. 
The surveys conducted in this study reveal that the gap, which was C10.00 in 
1988 after the legalization of the bureaux, narrowed to C2.00 in 1990, 
indicating a virtual absorption of the parallel sub-market (or "cow-lane" as it 
is popularly known in Accra) by the bureau market. 
By the end of December 1989, the divergence at the 160th auction week 
was 12.6 per cent. The continued existence of the spread/premium in the 
bureau market led to the introduction of the wholesale auction arrangement 
which replaced the retail system with effect from 23 March 1990. The 
exchange rates quoted in the bureau market exhibited erratic behaviour initially 
and later became fairly stable, while the spread between the buying and selling 
rates narrowed. The spread, which averaged C31.26 per week at the end of 
December 1989, narrowed to C16.50 at the end of April 1990. 
From 17 April 1990 the authorized dealer banks and the eligible foreign 
exchange bureaux were allowed to purchase foreign exchange from BOG for 
sale to their end-user customers and to meet their own foreign exchange needs; 
hence, the wholesale nature of the new auction. The authorized dealer banks 
and eligible bureaux are now allowed to determine freely the structure of their 
own bids at the wholesale auction and can sell foreign exchange to their 
customers with a margin that is determined by each authorized dealer. The 
wholesale auction continued to be based on DAS. 
Under the interbank market, authorized dealers (banks and bureaux) may 
trade in foreign exchange amongst themselves or with their end-user 
customers; BOG may also participate as a buyer or seller. In order to increase 
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the supply of foreign exchange, the new surrender requirements make it 
incumbent on exporters to lodge all proceeds from exports of non-traditional 
products in a commercial bank in Ghana upon receipt. Other export earnings, 
apart from electricity, are to be surrendered to BOG. On the demand side, the 
remaining restrictions on payment for current international transactions 
involving invisible payments were lifted; this marked significant progress 
toward the attainment of convertibility of the cedi. 
The major impacts of the wholesale auction and the interbank arrangements 
relate to the narrowing of excess demand in the auction market, reduction in 
the difference between the highest and lowest bid rates in the auction market, 
and the convergence of the marginal auction and the bureau exchange rates. 
The weekly mean excess demand in the auction market which, in absolute 
terms, was $0,349 million for the second quarter of 1990, fell to a weekly 
mean of $0,166 million in the last quarter of 1990. A worrying development, 
however, was the widening of the excess demand gap in the first quarter of 
1991 to a weekly mean average of $0,191 million. 
The difference between the highest bid rates in the auction market also fell 
from a weekly mean of C3.63 in the second quarter to C2.20 in the last quarter 
of 1990, and continued to be fairly low (C2.60) in the first quarter of 1991. 
The degree of divergence, which was 7.6 per cent at the end of April 1990, 
was completely eliminated in the last quarter of 1990. The most disturbing 
fact, however, is that the convergence attained in the auction and bureau 
markets since 9 November 1990 had started to widen again in the first quarter 
of 1991. There is, therefore, a need to critically review DAS and improve upon 
it in order to reduce gyrations in exchange rates and to speed up moves 
towards achieving and sustaining the unification of the auction and the bureau 
rates. 
In order to put the nature of the foreign exchange auction in proper 
perspective, it is imperative to examine the exchange policies that existed prior 
to the introduction of the auction system. A summary of developments in the 
exchange and trade regimes is provided in Table 1. Table 2 and Figures 1 and 
2 cover the paths of, and the divergence between, the official and parallel rate 
for the period 1956-90. 
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Table 1 Summary of exchange rate and trade regimes (1966-91) 
1966 Kwame Nkrumah (Convention People's Party (CPP)) overthrown. National Liberation Council (NLC) 
established; A. Afrifa became Chairman. 
1967 Cedi devaluation from C0.71: $1.00 to C1.02: $1.00. 
1969 Election of K Busia (Progress Party (PR)). 
1971 Cedi devaluation from.C1.02: $1.00 to C1.82: $1.00 (December) 
1972 Busia (PP) overthrown. National Redemption Council (NRC) established; I K Acheampong as 
Chairman (January). Cedi revaluation from C1.82: $1.00 to C1.28: $1.00. Import and exchange 
controls strengthened (February). 
1975 NRC replaced by Supreme Military Council (SMC); Acheampong as Chairman. Prices and 
exchange controls rigidly enforced; kalabule developed; and brain drain aggravated. 
1977 Consumer price index (CPI) inflation reached an all-time high of 116.5 per cent annual average. 
1978 SMC Chairman replaced; Akuffo as Chairman (July). Cedi devaluation from C1.28: $1.00 to C2.75: 
$1.00 (August). General economic and political unrest; and queues for essential commodities 
(essenco) grew longer (June 1978 May 1979). 
1979 J.J. Rawlings attempted coup and detention (May). Overthrow of SMP by Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) (June); Rawlings as Chairman. Fight against kalabule and 
bribery/corruption; Acheampong, Akuffo and Afrifa executed, Makola market destroyed 
(June September). Election of H Limann (September). 
1981 Limann overthrown. Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) established; Rawlings as 
Chairman (31 December). Price and exchange controls reinforced. 
1982/3 Bush fires, drought and crop failures. Murder of three judges. Alliance compliance order against 
Ghanaians in Nigeria. Stiffer price and exchange control measures adopted. Divergence between 
official and parallel exchange rates reached an all-time high of 4,264 per cent for the period 
1966 91. 
1983 Economic recovery programme launched (April). Cedi devaluation from C2.75: $1.00 to C30.00: 
$1.00 (October). CPI inflation reached 122.8 per cent annual average, the highest between 1966 
and 1991. 
1983/4 Purchasing power parity (PPP) of exchange rate determination on quarterly basis adopted. Trade 
controls eased. 
1986 PPP framework discontinued. Dual retail auction based on Dutch auction system introduced. 
Window 2 with C128.00: $1.00 exchange rate (September) operated side by side with Window 1 
with C90.00: $1.00 exchange rate. New import licensing arrangement introduced (October): "A", 
"S", "G" licences. (First auction was based on marginal pricing auction scheme but shifted to the 
Dutch auction system as from second auction.) 
1987 Windows 1 and 2 unified at exchange rate C156.00: $100 (February) (Auction 21). 
1988 Foreign exchange bureaux established. First bureau (Ladans) became operative (April). Bureaux 
not allowed to bid in the retail auction. 
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Table 1 cont... 
1989 Import licensing system and Import Programming and Monitoring Committee abolished following 
removal of all foreign exchange restrictions on the demand side (January). 
1990 Wholesale and interbank auction became operative (March). Bureaux allowed to purchase foreign 
exchange from the Bank of Ghana through authorized financial institutions. Eleven financial 
institutions participated in the wholesale market. Unification/convergence of marginal and buying 
bureau rates (September). 
1991 Divergence between marginal rate and the buying bureau rates began to widen (as from January). 
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Table 2 Divergence between official and parallel rates, 1956-90* 
7 
Official Parallel/ Degree of 
exchange bureau divergence 
Year rate (MR) rate (BR) B/n BR and MR(%) 
1956 0.71 0.56 -21.57 
1957 0.71 0.56 -21.57 
1958 0.71 0.56 -21.57 
1959 0.71 0.56 -21.57 
1960 0.71 0.56 -21.57 
1961 0.71 0.56 -21.57 
1962 0.71 0.56 -21.57 
1963 0.71 0.56 -21.57 
1964 0.71 0.56 -21.57 
1965 0.71 0.80 12.04 
1966 0.71 0.90 26.05 
1967 1.02 1.10 7.84 
1968 1.02 1.10 7.84 
1969 1.02 1.40 37.25 
1970 1.02 1.15 12.75 
1971 1.82 1.20 -33.99 
1972 1.28 1.35 5.47 
1973 1.15 1.40 21.74 
1974 1.15 1.54 33.91 
1975 1.15 1.92 66.96 
1976 1.15 4.35 278.26 
1977 1.15 7.69 568.70 
1978 2.75 10.00 263.64 
1979 2.75 14.29 419.64 
1980 2.75 11.11 304.00 
1981 2.75 50.00 1,718.18 
1982 2.75 120.00 4,263.64 
1983 30.00 97.00 223.33 
1984 50.00 120.00 140.00 
1985 59.99 170.00 183.38 
1986 90.01 181.70 101.87 
1987 166.50 219.99 32.13 
1988 212.10 263.63 24.30 
1989 277.34 335.92 21.12 
1990 331.15 342.14 3.32 
Source: Bank of Ghana / Ghana Statistical Service. International Financial Statistics of IMF; Pick's World 
Currency Year Books. 
* Between 1956 and 1967 the Ghanaian currency changed from the Ghana pound to an 84-pesewa cedi in 
1965 and to the new cedi (= 1.2,of the old cedi), hence some distortions are expected, particularly in the 
documentation of the parallel rates for this period. 
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Figure 1 Foreign exchange rate C:$: official and parallel bureau rates 
Year 
Figure 2 Foreign exchange rate: divergence between official and parallel rates 
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By way of summary it is crucial to note that the cornerstone of reform in 
the economic management system in Ghana since 1983 has been the 
realignment of the foreign exchange market and trade liberalization. Initially, 
with the launching of the economic reform programme (ERP), a series of large 
devaluations of the cedi were implemented between 1983 and 1986. During the 
same period, fiscal and monetary policies were put on an even keel. This series 
of devaluations was followed by allowing the cedi-dollar exchange rate to be 
determined by the forces of demand and supply in a weekly auction system. 
In order to absorb the parallel market into the legal foreign exchange market, 
foreign exchange bureaux were legalized, followed by merger of the exchange 
rates in the auction and bureau markets. The Dutch auction system (DAS) was 
adopted in the weekly auctioning of foreign exchange in the context of a retail 
arrangement and later in an interbank-cum-wholesale scheme. 
The main objective of this paper is to present an account of the nature and 
working of the foreign exchange market and the Dutch auction arrangement 
in Ghana from the inception of the ERP in 1983 up to the first quarter of 
1991. Before examining and analyzing the foreign exchange market in Ghana, 
it is necessary to outline a general theoretical framework within which Ghana 
is considered a special case. We then discuss the exchange rate policy that was 
in existence before the adoption of ERP in 1983, and follow this with an 
exposition, in Section II, of the multiple exchange rate system from April 1983 
to January 1986. Section III describes the operation of the dual exchange 
regime in a retail auction market based on DAS, and then discusses the DAS 
arrangement prior to the establishment of foreign exchange bureaux in April 
1988 and Section IV deals with their merger with the auction market. In 
Section V, we highlight the wholesale and interbank auction systems in Ghana. 
The paper ends with a brief evaluation and a research agenda. 
Theoretical framework 
The price of a domestic currency in terms of foreign currency is the exchange 
rate. This price can be rigidly fixed or, alternatively, allowed to be market-
determined. In the latter case, the exchange rate is determined by its demand 
and supply vis a vis the foreign currency. 
Demand for foreign currency (say the dollar) takes place when normal 
residents in a country buy non-domestic goods, services and assets, or lend to 
non-residents. Thus the demanders of foreign money are essentially the 
importers in another country. On the other hand, the supply of foreign 
exchange takes place when the non-residents buy the country's goods, services 
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arid assets and then use foreign currency to effect payment. The main sources 
of supply, therefore, are the country's exports, short-term and long-term capital 
flows (influenced mainly by the interest rate prevailing in, and expected future 
prospects of, the country), as well as foreigners' holdings of local currency.1 
In this perspective, therefore, the demander of foreign exchange is a 
supplier of local currency, while a demander of local currency is 
simultaneously a supplier of foreign exchange to the foreign exchange market. 
The local and foreign currencies trade for each other at an exchange rate in the 
framework of different foreign exchange arrangements. 
The two well-known auction systems for the determination of the exchange 
rate are the DAS and the marginal pricing auction system (MPAS); there is a 
third method known as the reserve pricing approach (RPA).2 In the DAS, each 
successful bidder pays his bid price for the foreign exchange until the market 
clears. The market-clearing price is the marginal exchange rate. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the supply of dollars to the DAS is assumed to 
be fixed at S$ F, which has to be cleared in one auction. This is not an 
unrealistic assumption in the context of Ghana. The demand curve, on the 
other hand, is negative, reflecting the negative relationship between the 
quantity of foreign currency demanded and the price to be offered for it. The 
demand curve is labelled D$. 
The curves depicting demand for and supply of the foreign exchange 
intersect at MR* or (C/S)E, as shown in the diagram. The DAS arrangements 
enable the authorities to appropriate all the consumer's surplus (which is the 
area ABC below the demand curve). In cases where the total demand at the 
marginal rate exceeds the supply, the bidders (whose bid prices are equal to 
the marginal rate) receive a pro-rated amount of the remaining foreign 
exchange. 
At a more depreciated rate, such as (C/$)H, there is an excess supply 
(positive excess demand) of foreign exchange by DF. Conversely, at a more 
appreciated exchange rate, such as (C/$)L, we have (negative) excess demand 
captured by GH. In practice, those whose bid prices are more appreciated than 
the market clearing exchange rate do not receive any foreign exchange; but 
those whose bid rates are more depreciated receive all their requests at their 
bid price. 
It is possible for the supply curve to shift in response to changes in the flow 
of foreign exchange, terms of trade, increase in volume of exports, etc., leading 
to changes in the equilibrium nominal exchange rates, given the demand curve. 
In Figure 1 an inward shift or a contraction of foreign exchange supply to $ L 
will cause the cedi to depreciate to (C/$)H with the market clearing at D; 
alternatively, an outward shift or an increase in supply will induce an 
appreciation of the cedi to (C/$)L, with the market clearing at H. 
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Figure 3 Demand and supply of foreign exchange in the Dutch auction system 
showing market clearing rate (MR) 
p 
(0/$)H = higher exchange rate in cedis per dollar, more depreciated than the MR; 
(0/$)E = marginal rate = MR*, market-clearing exchange rate; 
(0/$) t = lower exchange rate in cedis per dollar, more appreciated than the MR; 
ABC = consumer surplus appropriated by monetary authorities. 
It is important to note, however, that the auctioneer, in view of the model 
in the diagram, captures all the surplus in the auction market. But the existence 
of a positive divergence between the highest auction rates and the (highest) 
selling bureau rates confers a "surplus" of a kind on the buyers of foreign 
exchange on the auction market over and above those who purchase foreign 
exchange on the bureau market. The "surplus" is what we shall designate a 
"premium" captured by the degree of divergence between the official and the 
bureau rates. 
In the analysis of the relationship between the auction rate and the 
parallel/bureau rate, the focus is the premium. According to Pinto (1990) the 
black market foreign exchange premium is a tax on exports, creating a conflict 
between the partial financing of government spending and the recipients of 
foreign exchange at the official exchange rate on the one hand, and the 
allocative goal of stimulating exports on the other. The unification or 
convergence of the exchange rates in the auction and parallel or bureau 
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markets, therefore, becomes the major objective of any auction design in order, 
firstly, to increase exports and eliminate allocative inefficiency and inequity 
through import licence rents and, secondly, to absorb the black market into the 
official mainstream through economic incentives rather than unenforceable 
legislation, thereby raising the credibility of economic policy. The legalization 
of parallel markets by the establishment of bureaux de change as part of trade 
liberalization is to close the gap between the auction and the parallel rates. The 
continued existence of the gap is indicative of a basic disequilibrium in the 
exchange market and, therefore, has the tendency to (i) cause the auction rate 
to rise, (ii) induce a seepage of exchange from the auction to the 
bureau/parallel sub-market, (iii) reduce incentive to produce for export, (iv) 
encourage smuggling or contraband activities, or (v) propel capital flight. 
The process of liberalization of the exchange and trade controls, the nature 
of the auction design, and the soundness of financial/monetary and fiscal 
policies jointly determine the stability of exchange rates and the pace and 
speed of unification of the official and black market or parallel exchange rates. 
Initially, foreign exchange reform will increase uncertainty; this will, in turn, 
widen the gap between parallel and official rates, with the latter exhibiting 
extreme gyrations. But it is expected that, as economic agents gain more 
confidence in the adjustment process, the number of participants in the official 
auction market will increase, and exchange rate fluctuations will reduce as the 
divergence narrows, until finally unification is attained. 
It is in the light of the above reasoning that Grilli and Kaminsky (1991) 
postulate that the uncertainty effects should dominate in the short-run, while 
the increase in the number of traders should make the market thicker and tend 
to reduce volatility in the longer ran. Besides, the gap between the highest and 
the lowest auction bid rates will be narrowed, while the degree of divergence 
between the market-clearing rate and the parallel/bureau market exchange rate 
will be eliminated in the long-run. 
This principle is illustrated in Figure 4. The unification of the auction and 
bureaux markets requires the equality of the market clearing exchange rate 
E*mr and equilibrium market exchange rate £*B in the auction and bureau 
markets respectively. But in practice it is very difficult to measure E\. Hence, 
convergence can be seen instead in terms of equality of the highest auction 
rate £" and bureaux selling rate Thus the gap in AA 1 in Figure 4 captures 
the premium enjoyed by buyers of foreign exchange in the auction market over 
the bureaux, 
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Figure 4 Relationships between auction and bureau market rates 
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Auction market Bureaux market 
Quantity of foreign exchange (million dollars) 
£ | r = Bureau selling rate 
= Auction highest bid rate 
E®" = Bureau buying rate 
E u r = Auction marginal rate 
E* = Bureau equilibrium rate 
BOC = Bureau operating costs 
Q\ = Auction equilibrium quantity of foreign exchange 
Qj = Bureau equilibrium quantity of foreign exchange 
= Supply of foreign exchange to the auction market 
Q j = Demand for foreign exchange on the auction market 
Q| = Supply/purchases of foreign exchange (bureau market) 
Qg = Demand/sales of foreign exchange (bureau market) 
Qa = Quantity of foreign exchange in the auction market 
Qb = Quantity of foreign exchange in the bureau market 
P = E = exchange rate = price of dollars in cedis per dollar (C:$) 
It is, however, important to note that the divergence between the buying and 
selling rates (even though relevant in exchange risk analysis) is not a central 
issue here. A more crucial point is that the wedge between these two rates 
amounts to the bureau operating costs (BOC) (assuming competition). This is 
depicted by the supply curve Q^ = <2b- The BOC are going to be present even 
if there is some leakage from the auction market to the bureaux. Hence the 
relevant prices for measuring the divergence are E | r and E ^ . 
A significant issue, however, is that the auction and bureau markets are, at 
least partially, segmented in the sense that those required to be seen eligible 
to buy from the auction market are not the same transactors eligible for the 
bureau market. Some will switch between the two and these transactors will 
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have their positions in both markets. Also, there is no necessary relationship 
between and Eg 
For the above reasons, and from the sellers' point of view, it is when the 
marginal rate in the auction equals the bureau buying rate that we have 
unification of the two markets. From this perspective the gap BB1 shows the 
degree of divergence between the bureaux over the auction market exchange 
rates. A smaller gap reflects a smaller premium or a higher degree of 
convergence between the official and the bureaux rates. 
We define convergence as the equality of the two rates in principle. In 
practice, however, after allowing for capital controls, the cost of commission, 
paper work or form filling, and waiting, as well as uncertainty in the auction 
market vis a vis the instant/cash nature of, and the premium lost by buyers of 
foreign exchange from the bureau market, convergence used in this study is 
defined in line with Dordunoo (1993) as: 
"... a divergence of 6 per cent (or less) of auction rate from bureau 
exchange rate, and a fairly stable/predictable exchange rate. Thus, a 
divergence averaging between zero and 6 percent is acceptable as a 
condition for unification or an epsilon equilibrium (if it is greater than 
zero but less than or equal to 6 per cent) of the auction and the bureau 
exchange rate." 
It is important to note that this definition is not inconsistent with the concept 
used in Aron and Elbadawi (1994), which states that: 
"The term unification in the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) context refers 
to eradication of the parallel market. However, since these countries are 
likely to maintain capital controls in the medium term, there would 
remain a small role for the parallel market in meeting portfolio demand. 
Our concept of unification in SSA is thus a substantial reduction of the 
parallel market so that it is no longer a major signal in the economy". 
Figure 3 shows that, at a highly appreciated exchange rate below the 
marginal rate, there will be excess demand in the auction market. Similarly, in 
Figure 4 we observe excess demand in the bureau market at rates below the 
equilibrium rate. It is also clear that the lower the marginal rate ( E t h e 
greater the excess demand in the bureau market at the marginal rate. As the 
marginal rate rises (i.e. as the cedi depreciates), the excess demand in the 
bureau market will narrow. It is, therefore, expected that excess demand in the 
bureau market will cause an increase in the exchange rate in that market; this 
will then exert further pressure on the selling bureau rate to rise. This, in turn, 
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should lead to a higher marginal rate in the auction market unless (i) the 
auction is not well enough designed to capture market forces, and/or (ii) the 
marginal rate is a managed float (or the auctioneer supplies more foreign 
exchange in subsequent auctions). These issues will be investigated in this 
study. 
II Exchange policies prior to the 
auction regime 
Exchange rate policy before 1983 
During the initial phase of Ghana's ERP, a series of massive and discrete 
devaluations of the cedi had been implemented in order to realign the highly 
overvalued local currency and to reduce the acute shortage of foreign 
exchange, as well as the size of the parallel foreign exchange market. 
Following the devaluation in 1967 (after the overthrow of the first president 
in 1966) from C0.71: $1.00 to CI.02: $1.00, the exchange rate was rigidly 
fixed at C1.02: $1.00. It was again devalued in 1971 (which partially led to the 
overthrow of the government of the second republic) to CI.82: $1.00 in 1972; 
thereafter, the exchange rate was pegged at CI. 15: $1.00 for six years until 
another devaluation to C2.75: $1.00 in 1978. This rate lasted for five years up 
to 1982. The rate of inflation in Ghana, however, far exceeded the average 
inflation rates of its trading partners. Consequently, the real exchange rate 
appreciated by more than 500 per cent between 1970 and 1982.3 
The yawning gap between the demand for and supply of foreign exchange 
in the official market resulted in a substantial differential between the official 
and the parallel market exchange rates. In 1967, the degree of divergence 
(reflecting a percentage premium) between the two rates was about 8 per cent, 
but it increased steadily to 4,264 per cent at the end of 1982. As a result, the 
informal black market dominated in the mobilization and allocation of foreign 
exchange. The existence of a substantial black market and the premium of the 
parallel market rate over the official exchange rate indicate the disequilibrium 
between the demand for and the supply of foreign money at the exchange rate. 
Some of the demand pressures emanated from capital flight 4 (which reflected 
the lack of confidence and of legal investment opportunities). The shortfall in 
supply of foreign currency resulted from four policy actions in the early 1980s 
which reduced confidence in the Ghanaian banking system, namely, (i) C50.00 
notes were demonetized, (ii) bank deposits greater than C50,000.00 were 
frozen pending investigation for tax liability or fraud, (iii) bank loans to 
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finance trading inventories were recalled, and (iv) a requirement was imposed 
that business transactions exceeding CI,000.00 be conducted by cheque. 
Table 3 Annual exchange rate and degree of divergence between official and 
parallel exchange rates (C:$) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 
Official 0.71 1.02 1.15 2.75 2.75 
Parallel 0.80 1.15 1.92 11.11 50.00 
Divergence (%) 12.00 12.70 67,00 304.00 1,718.20 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986* 
Official 2.75 30.00 50.00 59.99 90.01 
Parallel 120.00 97.00 120.00 170.00 181.70 
Divergence (%) 4,264.00 223.30 140.00 183.40 101.90 
Sources: 
(a) International Financial Statistics (various issues of the Year Book). 
(b) Pick's/World Currency Year Book, Pick, F (various issues). 
* The exchange rates and the degree of divergence before September 1986. 
Additionally, bank borrowing (or deposit) rates were ridiculously low while 
lending rates were exorbitantly high, reflecting a high interest rate risk in the 
money market. Thus while effective deposit rate averaged less than 8 per cent, 
the effective lending rate averaged more than 22 per cent per annum with a 
pread of about 14 per cent. Consequently, a drastic financial disintermediation 
occurred in the form of large cash holdings (despite the high risk). The degree 
of financial intermediation (measured by M2-GDP ratio) which was more than 
29 per cent in 1976 declined steadily to as low as 11 per cent in 1983. Also, 
there was a strong preference for holding liquid assets abroad rather than 
transfering foreign exchange to Ghana. 
The impact of this included a sharp reduction in production and exports of 
goods as incentives had been removed. Besides, imports of essential consumer 
goods and producer inputs fell sharply, resulting in low production in both 
industrial and agricultural sectors, which, in turn, exerted inflationary 
pressures. Furthermore, external financing sources dried up due to Ghana's 
inability to service its debt obligations. These became worse as a result of the 
unilateral declaration of moratorium/repudiation (Yentua) in 1972. Estimates 
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show that external debt servicing arrears were over $600 million at the 
beginning of ERP in 1983.5 
Inception of a multiple exchange rate regime 
(April 1983 January 1986) 
Prior to 1983, the monetary and fiscal authorities could not implement large 
exchange rate adjustments as these could worsen political instability. But in 
April 1983, the government adopted many realistic exchange rate policy 
measures by devaluing the cedi in stages from C2.75: $1.00 to C90.00: $1.00 
by the third quarter of 1986. The scheme of bonuses on exchange receipts and 
surcharges on exchange payments was a transitional measure. The exchange 
device comprised a multiple exchange rate system of two official rates of 
C23.38: $1.00 and C30.00: $1.00 which were applied to specified receipts and 
payments. 
This scheme continued until 10 October 1983 when exchange rates were 
unified at C30.00: $1.00. After this, a real exchange rate rule, in the 
framework of PPP, was adopted. This rule required a quarterly adjustment of 
the exchange rates in accordance with relative inflation rates in Ghana and its 
major trading partners for the period 1983 84. The quarterly adjustment 
mechanism was replaced in December 1984 by more episodic exchange rate 
devaluations because the real exchange rate was still considered overvalued. 
The last discrete exchange rate adjustment, before the establishment of an 
auction system, brought the exchange rate to C90.00: $1.00 at the end of 
September 1986. 
During the same period, the black market premium remained high (about 
180 per cent) indicating the rationing of foreign exchange from official sources 
for the import of goods. Imports remained controlled within the framework of 
an annual import programme. There was a scheme for producers to utilize 
special unnumbered licences (SULs) which were mainly a channel for 
remittances from Ghanaians abroad. The SULs were used to finance imports 
of goods which were then sold at a profit on the domestic market. Also, before 
October 1986, the import licensing system involved two different import 
licences, namely, the Specific Import Licence (SPIL) and the Special Import 
Licence (SIL). While the specific licence allowed the use of foreign exchange 
from the banking system, the SIL carried the condition that the importer used 
his own foreign exchange resources. In 1985 there was a further liberalization 
by increasing the number of goods that could be freely imported under SIL, 
resulting in a shorter negative list. In this new arrangement, quantitative 
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restrictions on importation of goods had been removed and only subjected to 
the importers' access to foreign exchange from official sources. 
Despite the above policy measures, the cedi still remained overvalued, as 
reflected by the divergence between the parallel and official exchange rate, and 
deterioration in the balance of payments position. In order to accelerate the 
adjustment of the exchange rate and attain the objective of trade liberalization, 
the auction market was introduced on 16 September 1986. 
Ill The dual retail auction and the Dutch 
auction systems 
Dual exchange rate system in a retail auction market 
(September 1986 February 1987) 
Between October 1983 and 16 September 1986, all foreign exchange 
transactions operated under only one window, Window 1. Before the abolition 
of Window 1 in February 1987, the government shifted to a floating 
mechanism which was considered the best way of depoliticizing the issue of 
exchange rate adjustment. Besides, by resorting to a floating scheme the 
authorities were continually able to determine the exchange rate in line with 
the fundamental forces of demand and supply rather than having to resort to 
discrete devaluations as under the previous pegged regime. Added benefits of 
the new arrangement were the minimizing of capital flight and the prevention 
of collusion between the commercial banks. 
Under the new system, there was a dual exchange rate system comprising 
two windows. The Window 1 exchange rate was fixed at C90.00: $1.00, while 
the Window 2 exchange rate was determined by demand and supply in the new 
weekly auctions conducted by BOG. Window 1 was used for such transactions 
as debt service payments on official debt contracted before 1 January 1986, 
imports of crude oil, processed petroleum products, inputs for Ghana Italian 
Petroleum (GHAIP), and essential drugs. Corresponding to the duality of the 
exchange rates, the surrender of exchange earnings to BOG was effected at 
two different rates. Earnings from exports of cocoa and residual oil products 
were to be surrendered at Window 1 exchange rate. All other transactions 
(about 66 per cent of external payments and receipts) were conducted through 
Window 2. 
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Retail nature of the auction 
The new dual exchange rate system empowered BOG to auction foreign 
exchange on a weekly basis to final users only; this underlines the retail nature 
of the auction system. Authorized dealer banks had a very limited intermediary 
role to play in the new system. Their main functions were to centralize the 
bids for auction funds from their clients and then channel these bids to BOG. 
Import licence under the dual exchange rate system 
With the establishment of the dual exchange rate system, a new import 
licensing arrangement was introduced from 6 October 1986. There were three 
types of licence, namely, "A", "S" and "G". The "A" licence permitted the 
holder to bid for foreign exchange through the auction system and initially it 
was issued for drugs and producer inputs such as raw materials, semi-finished 
products, spare or repair parts, and machinery. Holders of an "S" licence could 
use their own foreign exchange resources to import goods with the provision 
that such imports were undertaken under the existing SIL regulations. The "G" 
licences were allocated to Government organizations for the importation of 
essential commodities. The foreign exchange for "G" licence holders was 
directly allocated outside the auction system. 
The main characteristic of the new licensing system was the inclusion of all 
non-consumer goods under "A" licences, giving access to foreign exchange 
from the auction. In the previous arrangement, elegibility for the auction had 
been limited to very few goods and only importers who had acquired a specific 
import licence. Additionally, there were no restrictions on the number of "A" 
licences. This led to the elimination of monopoly rents that could be reaped in 
the previous scheme because of limitations imposed on the number of specific 
import licences. 
Holders of a valid import licence, and persons or institutions who received 
the approval of the exchange control authorities to undertake service payments 
or make an outward transfer, were eligible to bid in the auction market. But 
other traders were to import goods using their own foreign exchange as long 
as such imports were allowed under the existing SIL regulations. 
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Supply and retention of foreign exchange 
During the period under consideration, partial surrender requirements continued 
to be enforced. Exporters were generally allowed to retain up to 35 per cent 
of their export proceeds in accounts abroad for financing essential imports. The 
retention ratio was 45 per cent for Ashanti Gold Mining Company, 20 per cent 
for log exporters, and 5 per cent for the Cocoa Board. The retention did not 
apply to exports of residual oil and electricity, and receipts from electricity 
exports were not surrendered to BOG but kept in the Volta River Authority's 
accounts abroad. 
Apart from these, all foreign exchange earnings were to be repatriated and 
sold to the BOG (directly or through commercial banks). After foreign 
exchange allocation to the Government and certain other public institutions, 
BOG decided the amount of foreign exchange to auction. The extra-auction 
exchange transactions were affected through the marginal rate of Window 2. 
The primary objective of the auction is to narrow the spread between the 
parallel and official exchange rates. The official or marginal rate depreciated 
from C128.00: $1.00 at the first auction on 19 September 1986 to C152.00: 
$1.00 at the 14th auction on 19 December 1986. In the event, the 
spread/premium of the parallel exchange rate over the marginal rate declined 
from 41 per cent at the first auction to 20 per cent at the 14th auction (at the 
end of December 1986). See Figure 5. 
Figure 5 Time series graph of exchange rates, 19 September 1986 14 October 
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The switch from marginal pricing to the Dutch auction system 
The first auction was based on MPAS in the determination of the exchange 
rate, in which case all the successful bidders pay the marginal price. But as 
from the second auction DAS was adopted. Under DAS successful bidders 
paid the bid price. 
Bidders submitted their bids to BOG in sealed envelopes by the end of 
Thursday each week. Auctions were conducted every Friday. Bidders used a 
standard bid form and enclosed specified supporting documents, such as import 
licence, letters of credit, pro forma invoice, etc. Bids could be for US dollars, 
British pounds, German marks, French francs and Japanese yen. A bidder was 
required to state the currency, the amount being bid for, and the bid price he 
was willing to pay. There was no restriction on the bid price. 
The adoption of DAS led to a multiple currency practice. But the auction 
was conducted in US dollars. Consequently, the dollar equivalent of bids in 
currencies other than the dollar was determined using the most recent cross 
rates6 between the dollar and other currencies in the international currency 
markets.7 A bidder was obliged to submit an authorization from his 
commercial bank that allowed BOG to debit the Bank's account with 100 per 
cent of the cedi equivalent of a successful bid. Additionally, the bid must be 
above $500. 
The clearing of the auction was supervised by a foreign exchange auction 
committee that included representatives from BOG and several ministries. The 
bids were verified against the elegibility criteria mentioned above. 
After that, the committee determined the marginal exchange rate as the rate 
where the foreign exchange supply made by BOG was exhausted by the 
demand. The demand at the most depreciated exchange rates was satisfied first. 
There were cases where the total demand at the marginal rate exceeded the 
supply at that rate. In that case, the bidders whose bid prices were equal to the 
marginal rate received a pro-rated amount of the foreign exchange. 
The marginal exchange rate declared on the auction day (until a new rate 
was announced) applied to all extra-auction transactions such as (i) all foreign 
exchange bought by BOG, (ii) foreign exchange outside the auction, and (iii) 
foreign exchange sold to the commercial banks to replenish their working 
balances. 
Apart from the switch from MPAS to DAS, there were several 
modifications of the Ghanaian auction market even though its retail nature had 
remained intact. The two windows that coexisted from September 1986 were 
unified on 19 February 1987.8 Thus, from the 21st auction week to the 176th 
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auction week (27 April 1990) all transactions through the banking system were 
settled according to the marginal rate determined in the weekly retail auction. 
Following the abolition of Window 1, BOG widened access to the auction 
market in order to expand the coverage of the exchange arrangement. This 
arrangement more closely represented market conditions during the period 
1987-89. As of 20 March 1987, several categories of imports subject to the 
SIL scheme (which was more than a third of the value of all goods previously 
excluded from the "A" licensing scheme) were now included in the "A" list of 
goods eligible for foreign exchange from the auction. From 14 September 
1987, additional SIL goods about one half of the value of all SIL goods were 
moved onto the "A" list of goods. On 5 February 1988, all remaining goods 
under the SIL scheme were moved onto the "A" list of goods, with the 
exception of beer and stout, cigarettes, cement pipes, asbestos and fibre roofing 
sheets and those goods prohibited for non-trade reasons. 
The removal of all foreign exchange restrictions on the demand side meant 
that existing administrative arrangements for import licensing became 
redundant. Therefore, the import licensing system together with the Import 
Programming and Monitoring Committee (IPMC) (comprising the Secretaries 
of Finance and Economic Planning, Industries, Agriculture, Trade, and Health, 
and the Governor of the Bank of Ghana) were abolished on 14 January 1989. 
After this, importers were requested simply to file an import declaration form 
at their commercial banks. 
Demand for the dollar on the auction, emanating from payments for 
invisibles, also underwent changes in the 1987-89 period. From 13 March 
1987, services and transfer payments approved by the exchange control 
authorities became eligible for funding on the auction. Also, from 29 February 
1988, all bona fide requests for business travel (up to a maximum of $3,000 
per trip) became eligible for funding through the auction, as did transfers of 
profits and dividends from 1 February 1989. But transfer of profits by 
companies that had been financed with locally raised capital was not permitted. 
Supply of the dollar on the auction through export proceeds and the-
retention scheme were also modified. The aim was to increase the supply of 
foreign exchange to the auction and to reduce foreign exchange being held in 
retention accounts. First, the Cocoa Board's foreign exchange retention ratio 
was reduced from 5 to 2 per cent on 20 March 1987. Second, from 28 April 
1989, foreign exchange retention entitlements were to be credited to the 
exporters' foreign exchange accounts with banks located in Ghana within 60 
days of shipment. Third, cocoa exports under bilateral payment agreements that 
did not yield convertible foreign exchange receipts were gradually reduced to 
10,000 tons (less than 5 per cent of Ghana's total cocoa exports). 
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Objectives of the modifications in the auction market 
There were four major objectives behind the introduction of the new auction 
system and modifications implemented between 1987 and 1989, namely, to 
achieve an increased supply of foreign exchange to match increased demand, 
a reduction in the erratic behaviour of the exchange rate, a decrease in the 
spread between the highest and lowest bid (or marginal exchange rates), and 
finally, narrowing of the degree of divergence between the auction and the 
parallel rates. 
The Bank of Ghana was able to increase the supply to match the upsurge 
in demand for foreign exchange due to the further liberalization of 
international trade and finance. At the first auction, the total supply was $2.5 
million. The average weekly supply was $2,952 million in 1986 (after 
September) vis a vis a mean weekly demand of $4,804 million; the excess 
demand was $2,196 million over and above the supply of foreign exchange on 
the auction market. As can be seen from Table 4, the mean weekly supply 
increased steadily to $7,743 million in 1990 vis a vis a demand of $9,010 
million. It is important to note that excess demand (supply minus demand), in 
absolute terms, decreased slowly but steadily from $2,196 million in 1986 to 
$0,267 million in 1990. 
Table 4 Weekly mean3 supply of and demand for foreign exchange at auction 
market, 1986-90 (million dollars) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Supply 2.608 4.584 5.127 6.951 7.743 
Demand 4.804 5.884 6.240 7.960 8.010 
Excess demancf -2.196 -1.300 -1.113 -1.009 -0.267 
' Weekly mean supply (WMS) and weekly mean demand (WDM) were calculated for year j using the formula: 
N 
WMS. - i t s . 
y N U *  ^ ,J 
where i = 1,2,3 N, N = number of weeks of auction in a year, j = 1986, 1987 1990 = yth year. The 
demand analogue is: 
1 N WMD. = J_ Y D 
1 N U " 
b ( - ) means that demand exceeded supply of foreign exchange; excess demand = supply minus demand. 
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In addition, the mean weekly variation in the marginal rate declined. In 
terms of weekly percentage changes, the marginal rate variability, estimated 
to be 2.01 per cent in 1986, fell gradually to a little less than 0.23 per cent in 
1990. In the second week of auction, the change was 6.25 per cent but from 
then on declined steadily. The next highest weekly percentage change was 3.90 
per cent in 1987 in the nineteenth auction week. This figure went down to less 
than 2.00 per cent but then, in the 89th week in 1988, an extremely high 
weekly change of 4.98 per cent was recorded. Since then, however, the weekly 
variation has averaged less than 1.50 per cent.9 The mean weekly spread 
between the highest and the lowest bid rates in the auction market also 
declined from C24.07 in 1986 to C6.58 in 1987. Thereafter, it increased to 
C7.35 in 1988 and C9.55 in 1989, and fell to C2.72 in 1990. 
The picture is not significantly different when we consider the spread 
between the mean buying and selling parallel/black market rates. As shown in 
Table 5, the spread was C20.66 in 1986; it increased to C32.16 in 1987, and 
went up again by 12.4 per cent to C36.25 in 1988. It started to decline in 
1989, falling to C28.20, and again to C13.39 in 1990 (see Figures 6-9). The 
widening of the spread from 1986 to 1988 implies an increase in foreign 
exchange risk on the market and points to improper functioning of the auction 
for the period under consideration. 
A similar trend can be seen with regard to the degree of divergence between 
the bureaux buying rate and the marginal rate as a percentage of the latter. In 
1986, the divergence was 24.25 per cent; it increased to 32.13 per cent in 
1987, reflecting erratic behaviour in the auction market. 
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Table 5 Weekly mean spread between highest and lowest bid, buying and 
selling rates and degree of divergence between marginal and parallel 
bureau rates, 1986-90 
1986a 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Highest auction bid rate (HR) 158.40 171.37 218.40 285.88 333.32 
Lowest auction bid rate (LR) 134.40 164.79 211.05 276.34 330.60 
Spread (HR-LR)" 24.00 6.58 7.35 9.55 2.72 
Marginal rate (MR) 146.00 166.50 212.10 277.34 331.15 
Bureau buying rate (BR) 181.70 219.99 263.63 335.92 342.14 
Bureau selling rate (SR) 202.36 252.15 299.78 364.12 355.53 
Spread (SR-BR) 20.66 32.15 36.15 28.20 13.39 
Divergence (%)c 24.25 32.13 24.30 21.12 3.32 
° With effect from September 1986. 
" The weekly mean spread between the highest and lowest rates (WMSHL) is the difference between the 
weekly mean highest bid rate (HR) and the weekly mean lowest bid rate (LR). Each of the rates is a simle 
arithmetic mean. Alternatively, the WMSHL can be obtained directly from the weekly raw data by the formula 
1 N t WMSHL. = _L T \HRn - LR ' N 11 1 
where /'= 1, 2, 3 N, N = number of weeks of auction in a yea r ; /= 1986, 1987 1990 = yth year; H ^ 
= highest bid rate in week i and in year j; and LR{j = lowest bid rate. 
0 The weekly mean degree of divergence (WMDD) is obtained by the formula 
WMDDj BRj / MRjj - * 100% 
After 1988, however, the divergence went down to 3.32 per cent which 
represented a near unification of the two rates. 1 0 It is important to note that 
the above "near-merger position of the official and the parallel exchange rates" 
has been attained after 210 auctions spanning 3.25 years of auctioning and 7 
years of exchange rate and trade stabilization. This period seems rather long. 
Indeed, it is a "gradualist" approach to realignment of the exchange rate 
market. 1 1 In the author's view, the fact that it took a very long time for the 
parallel and official markets to converge, and the behaviour of the market 
exchange rates to become erratic may be ascribed to the design and/or 
operation of the market system. 
R E S E A R C H P A P E R 2 4 
Figure 6 Foreign exchange graph: marginal and buying bureaux 
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Figure 8 Parallel selling/marginal rate ratio and buying/marginal rate ratio 
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Figure 9 Foreign exchange graph (buying and selling bureau rates) 
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As outlined above, the auction market in Ghana has performed erratically 
given the supportive institutional arrangements and foreign exchange assistance 
from which it has benefitted. It has also taken a long time for the objectives 
to be realized. Despite this, however, many positive developments took place, 
albeit rather late. For example, the premium that the parallel rate had over the 
official exchange rate fell (as evidenced by the degree of divergence between 
the official and the parallel exchange rate) from 24.25 per cent in 1986 to 3.32 
per cent in 1990 (having risen to 32.13 per cent in 1987, and then fallen to 
24.3 per cent in 1988 and 21.12 per cent in 1989). 
The key objectives in the attempt to liberalize and stabilize the exchange 
rate and trade regime of Ghana were finally accomplished by the legalization 
of the parallel market. 
IV The foreign exchange bureaux 
Establishment of foreign exchange Bureaux de Change 
In order to absorb the parallel/black market into the legal foreign exchange 
system in Ghana, foreign exchange bureaux were allowed to operate as from 
1 February 1988. 
The co-existence of a parallel market, especially when there is a substantial 
divergence between the parallel and official exchange rate, is indicative of a 
basic disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market and trade regime. In the 
view of Quirk et al. (1987), an auction arrangement based on DAS inhibits 
entry to the auction market by participants who fear having to pay a price 
significantly higher than the clearing price for exchange if their bid is 
successful, leading to the continued existence of a black market and collusion 
before auctions. But it is essential to note than in addition to the inhibition 
imposed on bidders in the DAS, the rejection of bids from participants and, 
more importantly, an excessively overvalued exchange rate in the official 
market, have the effect of encouraging the co-existence of a black market. 
Thus, despite the modifications in, and institutional arrangements for, the 
implementation of the foreign exchange auction, divergence between the 
marginal rates and parallel rates widened from 24.25 per cent in 1986 to 32.12 
per cent in 1987. This compelled the authorities to legalize the parallel market 
by the introduction of foreign exchange bureaux. The first foreign exchange 
Bureau, became operative on 8 April 1988; by the end of June 1988 119 
bureaux had come into full operation, and by early 1990 over 180 bureaux 
were fully licensed. The foreign exchange bureaux were owned and operated 
as separate entities by individuals, groups of individuals, banks or institutions, 
provided they had been licensed. 
Rules and regulations 
Commercial bank bureaux were to function independently of, and separate 
from, normal banking operations. Other rules and regulations authorized the 
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bureaux to buy and sell foreign exchange at freely negotiated rates and to be 
free to quote buying (or bid) and selling (or offer) prices, and specified that 
neither the bureaux nor their customers/sellers were under any obligation to 
indicate or identify the sources of their foreign exchange. The bureaux were 
(until the establishment of wholesale and interbank auctions in April 1990) 
required to report their monthly transactions in terms of volume of purchases 
and sales by type of currency to BOG. 
Bureaux could purchase traveller's cheques only in US dollars and British 
pounds, and were to purchase and sell currency notes only in Canadian dollars, 
Deutsche marks, French and CFA francs, and US dollars. However, in practice, 
traveller's cheques in other foreign currencies and other currency notes were, 
and still are, transacted in the bureaux market. Also, all legal imports and 
services were, and still are, allowed to be funded through the bureaux. 
Supply of, and demand for, foreign exchange in the 
bureau market 
The main sources of supply of foreign exchange are exporters' retention 
accounts, receipts from unofficial (particularly non-traditional) exports, private 
remittances, and from the general public. The key demand sources include all 
those engaged in legal import and service payments, and capital transactions. 
The latter is illegal in some cases because "all outgoing capital movements 
must be approved by BOG; application for such transfers must be supported 
by documentary evidence and are considered on their merits". 1 2 
Remittances by non-Ghanaian employees and self-employed persons were, 
and still are, allowed through the bureaux but were usually limited to 40 per 
cent of new annual earnings, up to a maximum of $2,600 per annum, plus 
leave allowance.1 3 
Developments in the foreign exchange bureau market 
With the establishment of the bureaux, Ghana's exchange arrangements were 
characterized by the co-existence of two spot foreign exchange markets where 
spot rates were quoted. 1 4 The auction and the bureaux markets were effectively 
segmented between 8 April 1988 and 29 December 1989. Foreign exchange 
bureaux were not allowed to bid for foreign exchange in the weekly retail 
auction. 1 5 The absence of seepage between the two markets (in view of the 
existing regulatory framework at the time) resulted in imbalances between the 
supply of and the demand for foreign exchange. This partially explained the 
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divergence between the exchange rates in the bureau and the auction markets, 
as outlined above. 
The exchange rate differential between the two markets, which was 24.25 
per cent in 1986, widened sharply to 32.13 per cent in 1987 and continued to 
be fairly high in the first half of 1989. This was, among other factors, due to 
the termination of contraband activities involving the sale of cocoa by 
Ghanaian farmers and traders to neighbouring countries (firstly, because of 
difficulties experienced by those countries in marketing their cocoa and, 
secondly, because of the increase in the producer price of cocoa being offered 
to the farmer in Ghana). 1 6 An end to these illegal cross-border activities 
reduced the supply of foreign exchange to the bureaux. 
Despite the fairly wide premium that existed between the auction and the 
bureau exchange rates, the latter got closer to the parallel rate. The results of 
the surveys conducted in this study reveal that the gap, which was C10.00 in 
1988 after the legalization of the bureaux, narrowed to C2.00 in 1990, 
indicating a virtual absorption of the parallel sub-market by the bureau market. 
The latter "cow-lane" may be thought of as the Wall Street of Ghana. 
Following the legalization of the bureaux in Ghana, the volume of 
transactions through the bureau foreign exchange market showed tremendous 
progress. The monthly transactions were about $0,534 million in purchases and 
$0,660 million in sales in April 1988. The purchases and sales proceeded to 
rise quickly and steadily to $7,800 million and $8,500 million respectively in 
August 1988. As can be seen from Table 6, the volume of monthly 
transactions remained fairly stable at about $10 million after the first quarter 
of 1989. 
Merger of the auction and bureau foreign exchange markets 
The key objectives behind the institutionalization of the bureaux were to 
eliminate the parallel market, to capture the main market forces directly behind 
the determination of the cedi-dollar rate, and to absorb the bureau/parallel 
market into a single foreign exchange market. The principal consideration and 
the historical rationale behind these objectives can be discerned in the 
Government's intention to minimize and eventually eliminate the use of any 
administrative mechanism in the allocation of foreign exchange, and then 
replace it with the forces of demand and supply to bring foreign exchange 
outside the banking system into the legal auction/bureau market, and finally to 
attain full trade liberalization. 
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Table 6 Monthly mean foreign exchange bureau transactions, 1986-90 (million 
dollars per month)3 
April August Q3 Oct. Q4 
1988" 1988 1988 1988b 1988 
Purchases 0.534 7.800 7.350 6.900 7.632 
Sales 0.606 8.500 7.550 6.600 7.531 
Difference -0.126 -0.700 -0.200 0.300 0.101 
No. of bureau in operation0 10 70 NA NA 119 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 
1989 1989 1989 1989 1990 
Purchases 10.812 10.632 9.901 10.001 13.210 
Sales 9.735 9.644 9.795 10.000 13.402 
Difference 1.077 0.988 0.106 0.001 -0.192 
No. of bureau in operation0 140 180 NA NA NA 
"Preliminary estimates calculated from a sampled of 61 out of 180 bureaux. 29 bureaux, from a sample of 
60, did not respond to the questionnaire. Some bureaux at Elubo (near the Cote d'lvoire border), Takoradi, 
Aflao (near the Togo border), Cape Coast, and a few from Kumasi did not reply. Over 51 per cent of the 
bureaux that did respond were in Accra. Because of the use of averages, the figures may be biased. 
b Source: World Bank (1989). 
'Source: Bank of Ghana. 
The attainment of these objectives required the exchange rates to be equal 
on the two markets. In particular, the marginal rate in the auction market must 
equal the buying bureau rates. As can be seen in Figure 6, there have been two 
big steps/jumps in the marginal rate, first from C211.00 to C215.00 (an 
increase of 4.98 per cent on the 90th over the 89th auction) and, second, from 
C242.00 to C258.00 (an increase of 6.61 per cent on the 117th over the 116th 
auction). Before and after these jumps the marginal rate levelled off, even 
though there were (i) periods of larger divergences between the marginal rates 
and the bureau buying rates, and (ii) excess demand in the auction market. 
These developments seem to suggest that either the auction has been a 
managed float or the auction design has not been effective in capturing the 
forces of demand and supply of foreign exchange, or both. 
The degree of divergence by the 160th auction week on 22 December 1989 
was 12.6 per cent (as noted in Table 5). The continued existence of the spread 
or premium led to the introduction of the wholesale auction system. The 
wholesale auction, which replaced the retail system, became operative with 
effect from 23 March 1990. Under the wholesale auction, a composite 
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exchange rate system was operated, namely, an interbank and a wholesale 
system. 
In December 1989, guidelines were provided to enable the participation of 
dealer banks and eligible foreign exchange bureaux who would purchase 
foreign exchange from BOG to meet their own import requirements and on 
behalf of their end-user customers. The eligibility criteria for the bureaux were 
that (i) the bureau must have been in operation for at least a year, (ii) it must 
have had a monthly turnover averaging $250,000 or more during the previous 
six months, and (iii) it must arrange to use the facilities of authorized dealer 
banks for disbursement of auction funds. 
The customers (or end-users) were to submit applications for foreign 
exchange to authorized dealer banks and eligible bureaux indicating the bid 
rate, the amount, and the currency required. The consolidated exchange 
requirement at each bid rate computed by each bureau was submitted to the 
auction through authorized dealer banks. The dealer banks then submitted the 
aggregated bids of their end-user customers to BOG together with their own 
bids and those received through eligible foreign exchange bureaux. The 
eligibility of bids was no longer decided by BOG but by the 11 participating 
commercial banks, as well as eligible foreign exchange bureaux. 
DAS was retained. Thus, the successful bidders were required to pay for 
their foreign exchange allocation at their respective bid rates plus a margin 
determined by each authorized foreign exchange bureau and the dealer bank. 
The immediate effects of the above institutional modification were (i) an 
increase in the number of bidders/participants in the auction, (ii) a narrowing 
of the spread between auction and bureau rates, and (iii) an increase in the 
number of authorized dealers, thereby laying a solid foundation for the merger 
of the bureaux and the official foreign exchange markets. 
Developments between the end of December 1989 
and the end of April 1990 
The expansion of the transactions in the auction market reduced the excess 
demand that hitherto was not satisfied on the official auction market and which 
usually spilled over to the foreign exchange bureaux. 
Also, the operations of the bureaux were broadened; consequently, as 
participants gained more confidence in the market, speculative pressures 
subsided leading to a further narrowing of the degree of divergence between 
the auction and the bureau exchange rates. The degree of divergence between 
the marginal and the bureau buying rates narrowed steadily from 12.6 per cent 
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at the end of December 1989 to 7.6 per cent at the end of April 1990 (as can 
be seen from Figures 6-9). 
The exchange rates quoted in the bureau market exhibited erratic behaviour 
initially and later remained fairly stable, while the spread between the buying 
and selling rates narrowed. For the same period, the spread between the selling 
and buying bureau rates, which averaged C31.26 per week, narrowed to 
CI6.50 by the end of April 1990. 
V Wholesale and interbank systems for 
7 April 1990 and beyond 
With effect from 23 March 1990, the wholesale auction became operative. As 
from 27 April 1990, the authorized dealer banks and the eligible foreign 
exchange bureaux were allowed to purchase foreign exchange from BOG for 
sale to their end-user customers and to meet their own foreign exchange needs. 
In the pre-end-April 1990 arrangement, the authorized dealers were not 
allowed to be on their own account and, with the exception of the bids 
covering their own import needs, dealers' bids were to be entirely backed by 
firm bids by end-users of foreign exchange. In effect, the dealer banks and 
bureaux were not allowed to bid for themselves for the purposes of reselling; 
now they may. 
The authorized dealers, therefore, were now allowed to determine freely the 
structure of their own bids at the wholesale auction. They could now sell the 
foreign exchange obtained in the auction to their customers plus a margin 
determined by each authorized dealer. The wholesale auction continued to be 
based on DAS. 
Interbank auction system 
Under the interbank market, authorized dealers may trade in foreign exchange 
among themselves or with their end-user customers. The main provisions are 
that the foreign exchange traded in the interbank auction should not be subject 
to surrender requirements; BOG may also participate as a buyer or seller in the 
interbank market; authorized dealer banks' working balances should not exceed 
a given maximum, and balances in excess of that after 14 days may be kept 
with BOG; banks are to provide weekly reports on their gross holding, 
showing the banks' own balances and total balances in customers' accounts. 1 7 
In order to increase the supply of foreign exchange to the interbank market, 
the surrender requirements have remained almost the same as under the retail 
auction and the wholesale auction systems. Under the new requirements, 
however, all proceeds from exports of non-traditional products must be lodged 
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in a commercial bank in Ghana upon receipt. Other export earnings, apart from 
those from electricity, are to be surrendered to BOG. 
On the demand side, the remaining restrictions on payment for current 
international transactions involving invisible payments were lifted. This was 
a step toward full liberalization of the exchange system; it marked significant 
progress toward the attainment of convertibility of the cedi. 1 8 
Effects of the wholesale and interbank auction systems 
Between 27 April 1990 and 8 June 1990 the authorized dealer banks were very 
cautious in bidding at the wholesale auctions on their own account. Therefore, 
transactions in the interbank arrangement were limited. But as from 8 June 
1990, business on the interbank market became brisk as the dealer banks tried 
to buy foreign exchange over and above the actual bid requirements of their 
end-user customers and to then sell the excess to the public at small margins. 
Since 8 June 1990 (which was the twelfth wholesale auction) the number of 
authorized participating financial institutions has remained at 11 commercial 
banks. 
The major impact of the wholesale auction and the interbank arrangements 
relates to the narrowing of excess demand on the auction market, reduction in 
the difference between the highest and lowest bid rates in the auction market, 
and the convergence of the marginal auction and the bureau exchange rates. 
The weekly mean excess demand in the auction market, which was, in absolute 
terms, $0,349 million for the second quarter in 1990, fell to a weekly mean of 
$0,166 million in the last quarter of 1990. A worrying development, however, 
was the widening of the excess demand gap in the first quarter of 1991 to a 
weekly mean average of $0,191 million. 
The difference between the highest bid rates in the auction market also fell 
from a weekly mean of C3.63 in the second quarter to C2.20 in the last quarter 
of 1990 and continued to be fairly low (C2.60) in the first quarter of 1991. 
The degree of divergence, which was 7.6 per cent at the end of April 1990, 
was completely eliminated in the last quarter of 1990, as can be seen from 
Figures 6-9. The most disturbing development, however, was that the 
convergence attained in the auction and bureau markets after 9 November 1990 
started to widen again in the first quarter of 1991. 
VI Conclusion and research agenda 
The major inference from this study is that important lessons can be learnt on 
the basis of the Ghanaian experience. In particular, it demonstrated that foreign 
exchange rate reform involves a tremendous amount of institutional and 
foreign exchange support, sound fiscal and monetary policies and judicious 
trade and price regimes. A11 this must, of necessity, be implemented within an 
enabling macroeconomic environment. 
It is worth to note that prior to April 1983 before the ERP was launched the 
Ghanaian cedi was heavily overvalued; the monetary and fiscal authorities 
could not implement large exchange rate adjustments as these could worsen 
political instability. As part of the reform process, the cedi was devalued in 
phases from C2.75:$1.00 to C90.00:$1.00 by September 1986. Additionally, 
the Government utilized the scheme of bonuses on exchange receipts and 
surcharges on exchange payments as a transitional measure. In the process, the 
exchange device adopted comprised a multiple exchange rate system of two 
official rates applied to specified receipts and payments respectively. Besides, 
a scheme was introduced for producers to utilize special unnumbered licences 
(SULs) which were mainly a channel for remittances from Ghanaians abroad. 
The SULs were used to finance imports of goods which were then sold at a 
profit on the domestic market. 
After September 1986, a dual retail auction based on Dutch auction system 
and a special arrangement involving two windows were introduced. Window 
2 starting with C128.00:$1.00 exchange rate operated side by side with 
Window 1. While the exchange rate of Window 1 was fixed at C90.00:$1.00, 
that of Window 2 was determined by demand and supply in line with the 
weekly auctions. In February 1987, Window 1 was abolished and access to the 
auction market widened. With virtually all foreign exchange restrictions 
removed, the existing administrative arrangements for import licensing became 
redundant. Consequently, the import licensing system together with the Import 
Programming and Monitoring Committee were abolished in January 1989. 
Side by side with the removal of the restrictions on the foreign exchange 
transactions was the establishment of foreign exchange bureaux de change 
aimed at absorbing the parallel market into the legal foreign exchange system 
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in Ghana. Between April 1988 and early 1990, over 180 bureaux were fully 
licensed. The introduction of the bureaux led to the narrowing of the spread 
between the official and the parallel rates. As the operations of bureaux were 
broadened, participants gained more confidence in the market and the 
speculative pressures subsided. 
The last stages of the foreign exchange reform (towards unification of the 
parallel and official rates) were achieved with the introduction of wholesale 
and interbank auctions that became operative in March 1990. The foreign 
exchange bureaux which were hitherto prohibited, were now allowed to 
purchase foreign exchange from the BOG through authorised financial 
institutions. 
Two basic methods of reform lend themselves for consideration, namely, 
overnight reform and gradualist transformation. The latter has been adopted in 
Ghana, and seemed to be much more suitable for a country with a highly 
overvalued local currency and an economy where exchange rate devaluation 
results in political instability. The most important consideration, however, is 
the design of a workable foreign exchange auction framework that takes into 
account the peculiarities of the economy. There are three broad auction 
designs, namely, DAS, MPAS, and RPA arrangements, each of which has 
many variants. The nature of the auction design has implications for 
developments in the foreign exchange market. 
Indeed with the adoption of the DAS, official exchange rate gyrations 
abated, excess demand in the auction market contracted, the difference between 
the highest and lowest bid rates narrowed and convergence/unification of the 
(official) marginal and bureau exchange rates was attained. Despite these 
positive developments, variability in the exchange rate has started to increase 
while the unification that had been achieved has begun to open again, even 
though monetary and fiscal policies remain sound. 
The question to be raised is this: 
"After all this institutional and foreign exchange support in a sound 
fiscal and monetary policy environment, why is it that the foreign 
exchange market in Ghana behaved erratically and continued to co-exist 
with a bureau sub-market?" 
As we have already noted, an auction arrangement based on DAS inhibits 
entry to the auction market by participants who fear having to pay a price 
significantly higher than the clearing price for exchange if their bid is 
successful, and this results in the continued existence of a black market and 
collusion before auctions. 
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Also, the existence of excess demand in the market points to the need for 
BOG's buying exchange rate to rise in order to increase the incentive for 
exporters to surrender their earning to increase further the supply of foreign 
exchange. But this was not possible under DAS. DAS, therefore, raises 
questions as to which exchange rate will be relevant to the after-auction market 
transactions during the auction interval of one to two weeks, or more 
particularly, when the supply of foreign exchange falls short of demand. The 
gap between the marginal rate (used for outside-auction transactions and for 
the purchase of foreign exchange by BOG) and the parallel rate closed only 
after a very long period, and it has started to diverge again. This may be due 
to the nature of DAS. 
A much more basic criticism of DAS is that it involves price discrimination 
and fails to capture the main forces of demand and supply that operate in the 
determination of exchange rate. Thus, very often, when excess demand 
widened, the marginal rate hardly responded. How do we overcome these 
weaknesses and attain a sustainable convergence within a reasonable space of 
time? In order to speed up the process and pace of unification of the parallel 
and official exchange rates, reduce excess demand, and narrow the gyrations 
in the exchange rates, another mechanism for exchange rate determination had 
been suggested in another study (Dordunoo, 1994). The system has been 
designated as the modified Dutch auction system (MDAS), and had been 
considered in a game theoretic prisoner's dilemma framework in the study. A 
suggested auction design that will minimize volatility of exchange rates for a 
given macroeconomic environment will be considered at a later stage. Of equal 
relevance for future study is the issue of sustai nubility of unification of the 
official and the parallel rates especially when the BOP supports from the IMF, 
the World Bank and other donor agencies cease. 
Footnotes 
1. It is crucial to note that in the context of Ghana, there were (and still 
are) two broad sources of foreign exchange to support the auction, 
namely, (i) own-generated foreign exchange through exports and 
inflows of unrequited transfers, and (ii) borrowing from external 
sources. The export-import or trade gap is what is financed by external 
multilateral and bilateral agencies; in other words, the locally generated 
funds are supplemented by external inflows. But the latter is influenced 
by Ghana's continued servicing of the foreign loan. 
2. Under MPAS, a single rate, the most appreciated bid price at which the 
available foreign exchange is exhausted, is applied to all successful 
bidders. Bidders who have offered rates more depreciated than the 
market-clearing rate receive all the foreign exchange they bid for at the 
marginal price; those whose bid rates are more appreciated will not 
receive foreign exchange; and those whose bid price is equal to the 
market-clearing rate will receive only part of what they bid for on the 
basis of an allocative rule. RPA hinges on the use of a reserve price for 
foreign exchange which is the most appreciated exchange rate at which 
the central bank will undertake to supply foreign exchange. 
A classification based on Smith (1982) advances two major 
types of auction systems for the purchase or sale of a single item, of 
which foreign exchange is an example. They are continuous auction 
systems (CAS) and sealed-bid auction systems (SBAS). Of the former 
category, there are two designs, namely English auction system (EAS) 
and the Dutch auction system (DAS); the latter category also has two 
arrangements, namely, first-price auction system (FPAS) and the 
second-price auction system (SPAS). In the context of the Ghanaian 
auction, it is the DAS which has been adopted. 
A much more detailed exposition on the various exchange rate 
arrangements can be found in Quirk (1987). A more recent work is 
Killick (1990). 
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3. The real exchange rate (RER) is calculated using the formula 
RER = (NER * /5P)/($ * PD) = NER * ( /yP D ) 
Where NER = nominal exchange rate in cedis per dollar, PF = foreign 
price, PD = domestic price. The dollar is the numeraire equated to 
unity. 
4. Capital flight takes place when domestic investments are expected to 
be unsafe or to yield low returns relative to returns available abroad. 
Outflow of capital can increase balance of payments disequilibrium and 
thereby exert further pressure for the depreciation of a currency. In 
principle, the main causes of capital flight are exchange rate 
overvaluation and expected devaluation, political instabilities and social 
unrest, high and volatile inflation, low domestic deposit rates because 
of interest rate controls, rapid monetary expansion, and large fiscal 
deficits, or other domestic policies that are perceived to be 
unsustainable. Capital flight occurs through different channels. 
Domestic importers, for example, attempt to obtain foreign exchange 
(and hoard it) before the domestic currency depreciates; exporters, on 
the other hand, postpone surrender of foreign exchange earnings to the 
central bank. These leads and lags in international financial transactions 
can reduce short-run exchange inflows. Illegal channels include 
smuggling, and over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of 
exports. 
Human capital flight takes the form of outflow of able-bodied 
skilled labour to overseas labour markets instead of rendering services 
within the economy to boost growth in the GDP. All these phenomena 
befell the economy of Ghana prior to 1983. For details about the 
principle of capital flight see Collins (1990). For other aspects of 
international payments and finance refer to Furness (1983). 
5. See World Bank (1985), and the World Bank's Debtor Reporting 
System and World Debt Tables (various issues) for details. 
6. The exchange rate between two given currencies can be obtained from 
the exchange rates of those two currencies in terms of a third currency. 
For example, given C/$ rate and $/DM rate, we can obtain C/DM by 
using the formula C/DM = C/$ x $/DM. The C/DM is then a cross 
rate. 
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7. The other currencies are the Australian dollar, Austrian shilling, 
Belgian franc, Canadian dollar, CFA franc, Danish croner, French 
franc, Deutschemark, Italian lire, Japanese yen, Dutch guilder, New 
Zealand dollar, Norwegian kroner, British pound, Spanish peseta, 
Swedish kroner, and Swiss franc. 
8. During the same period interest rates were decontrolled and prices of 
consumer goods were market-determined rather than set at government-
mandated prices. For a detailed account of the price decontrolling, 
fiscal, and monetary policies refer to Dordunoo (1990a), pp. 256-97, 
and Alderman (1990). For an earlier work that addressed the 
decontrolling policies between 1983 and 1986, refer to Ewusi (1987). 
9. The mean weekly variation (or percentage change) of the marginal rate 
(WMVMR) is calculated using the formula: 
where WMVMR is the mean weekly variation in marginal rate, t is 
time period, M is previous time period, i = 1, 2, ..., N is the ith week 
in a year. 
10. In some of the analytical work by the World Bank and the IMF in 
1989 the marginal rate was compared with the selling bureau rate. This 
is inaccurate in the sense that the marginal rate is the exchange rate for 
extra-auction financial transactions covering the purchase of foreign 
exchange by the BOG. Therefore, the appropriate rate to compare with 
the marginal rate is the buying rate of the bureaux for the premium 
and/or divergence analysis. In any case, the use of the selling rate will 
exaggerate the spread and, therefore, indicate a higher level of foreign 
exchange risk. The risk takes three forms: first, potential exporters may 
be unwilling to surrender their earnings for fear of having to pay higher 
prices - when they next come to need foreign exchange; second, 
importers may buy foreign exchange now and hoard it in the fear that 
the rate may depreciate in the future; third, there will be a strong 
temptation for seepage between the two markets to take place. 
1 N WMVMR = N U 
MR, . - MR / i i / -1, ; 
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11. For details on the overnight versus gradual reform approach to 
exchange markets see Pinto (1989 and 1990). 
12. For details about foreign exchange regulations in Ghana, refer to Caires 
and Fletter (1989) pp. 180-82. 
13. The rules governing payment for invisibles in Ghana, among other 
countries, are detailed in the IMF Annual Survey of Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Annual Report, IMF 
Washington DC (various issues). 
14. Spot rate is technically defined as foreign exchange rate for currency 
delivered within a maximum of two days. This must be contrasted with 
forward rate which is the exchange rate for currency to be delivered 
at a future date. When the forward exchange is expressed in terms of 
premiums or discounts from the spot rate then we have swap rate (see 
Rodriguez and Carter (1984)). 
15. Effective 29 December 1989, a "wholesale" auction system was 
introduced under which bureaux were allowed to purchase foreign 
exchange from BOG. 
16. The producer price to the cocoa farmer was C56,600 per ton in 
1985/86, C85,000 in 1986/87, C140,000 in 1987/88 but increased again 
to C165,000 in 1988/89 and C174,400 in 1989/90 (source Ghana Cocoa 
Board). 
17. Various types of foreign exchange account are available to both 
Ghanaian and overseas residents. Some of the accounts are (i) foreign 
exchange external accounts for customers who are to meet certain 
obligations in foreign exchange for the purchase of machinery and 
equipment, (ii) foreign accounts for overseas residents, (iii) foreign 
exchange accounts for local residents with foreign exchange obtained 
locally, and (iv) cedi-denominated foreign exchange accounts for 
diplomatic missions and similar organizations. 
18. The traditional definition of currency convertibility is "the unrestricted 
exchange of paper money into gold at a predetermined rate". In modern 
times it is "the unrestricted use of a country's currency for international 
transactions, allowing it to be freely exchanged for foreign currencies". 
This is the sense in which the concept is used here. Strictly speaking, 
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we are referring to current-account convertibility and not full 
convertibility since capital transfers are still subject to government 
controls. For details refer to Dordunoo (1990b). 
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Appendix 
Table A1 The foreign exchange market in Ghana 
Exchange 
Week of rate C:$ 
Date auction (marginal) 
Exchange Average Average Difference 
rate C:$ parallel/ parallel/ between 
(marginal) bureau bureau SR and BR 
% change (buying) (selling) rates 
19.09.86 1 128.00 180.00 200.00 20.00 
26.09.86 2 136.00 6.250 181.00 201.00 20.00 
03.10.86 3 145.00 6.618 181.00 203.00 22.00 
10.10.86 4 145.00 0.000 182.00 204.00 22.00 
17.10.86 5 151.00 4.138 181.00 205.00 24.00 
24.10.86 6 147.00 -2.649 181.00 205.00 23.50 
31.10.86 7 146.00 -0.680 181.00 203.00 22.00 
07.11.86 8 148.00 1.370 184.00 203.00 19.00 
14.11.86 9 149.00 0.676 184.00 203.00 19.00 
21.11.86 10 150.00 0.671 182.00 203.00 21.00 
28.11.86 11 151.00 0.667 181.00 202.00 21.00 
05.12.86 12 152.00 0.662 180.00 201.00 21.00 
12.12.86 13 154.00 1.316 183.00 200.00 17.00 
19.12.86 14 152.00 -1.299 182.00 200.00 18.00 
09.01.87 15 150.00 1.316 185.00 200.00 15.00 
16.01.87 16 152.00 1.333 184.00 201.00 17.00 
23.01.87 17 153.00 0.658 189.00 208.00 19.00 
30.01.87 18 154.00 0.654 190.00 219.00 29.00 
06.02.87 19 148.00 -3.896 193.00 222.00 29.00 
13.02.87 20 152.00 2.703 195.00 226.00 31.00 
20.02.87 21 150.00 -1.316 191.00 232.00 41.00 
27.02.87 22 153.00 2.000 199.00 238.00 39.00 
13.03.87 23 155.00 1.307 221.00 242.00 21.00 
20.03.87 24 156.00 0.645 219.00 248.00 29.00 
27.03.87 25 156.00 0.000 220.00 250.00 30.00 
03.04.87 26 156.00 0.000 219.00 250.00 31.00 
10.04.87 27 157.00 0.641 220.00 250.00 30.00 
24.04.87 28 158.00 0.637 221.00 250.00 29.00 
08.05.87 29 159.00 0.633 220.00 250.00 30.00 
15.05.87 30 159.00 0.000 220.00 250.00 30.00 
22.05.87 31 160.00 0.629 220.00 250.00 30.00 
29.05.87 32 157.00 -1.875 220.00 250.00 30.00 
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Table A1 cont ... 
Exchange Average Average Difference 
Exchange rate C:$ parallel/ parallel/ between 
Week of rate C:$ (marginal) bureau bureau SR and BR 
Date auction (marginal) % change (buying) (selling) rates 
05.06.87 33 157.00 0.000 221.00 251.00 30.00 
12.06.87 34 159.00 1.274 222.00 251.00 29.00 
19.06.87 35 159.00 0.000 221.00 252.00 31.00 
26.06.87 36 161.00 1.258 221.00 253.00 32.00 
03.07.87 37 162.00 0.621 222.00 254.00 32.00 
10.07.87 38 163.00 0.617 223.00 255.00 32.00 
17.07.87 39 162.00 -0.613 223.00 256.00 33.00 
24.07.87 40 162.00 0.000 224.00 257.00 33.00 
31.07.87 41 162.00 0.000 224.00 258.00 34.00 
07.08.87 42 162.00 0.000 227.00 260.00 33.00 
14.08.87 43 163.00 0.617 224.00 261.00 36.50 
21.08.87 44 164.00 0.613 226.00 263.00 37.00 
28.08.87 45 165.00 0.610 226.00 265.00 39.00 
04.09.87 46 166.00 0.606 227.00 264.00 37.00 
11.09.87 47 168.00 0.205 229.00 264.00 35.00 
18.09.87 48 171.00 1.768 229.00 264.00 35.00 
25.09.87 49 176.00 2.924 225.60 262.00 36.40 
02.10.87 50 175.00 -0.568 225.00 260.00 35.00 
09.10.87 51 174.00 -0.571 225.00 260.00 35.00 
16.10.87 52 174.00 0.000 225.00 260.00 35.00 
23.10.87 53 174.00 0.000 225.00 260.00 35.00 
30.10.87 54 174.00 0.000 226.00 259.00 33.00 
06.11.87 55 173.00 -0.575 226.00 258.00 32.00 
13.11.87 56 173.00 0.000 224.00 257.00 33.00 
20.11.87 57 174.00 0.578 224.00 256.00 32.00 
27.11.87 58 174.00 0.000 223.00 255.00 32.00 
04.12.87 59 175.00 0.575 224.00 256.00 32.00 
11.12.87 60 176.00 0.571 224.00 257.00 33.00 
18.12.87 61 176.00 0.000 226.00 258.00 32.00 
08.01.88 62 176.00 0.000 225.00 260.00 35.00 
15.01.88 63 176.00 0.000 227.00 261.00 34.00 
22.01.88 64 176.00 0.000 226.00 262.00 36.00 
29.01.88 65 178.00 1.136 226.00 262.00 36.00 
05.02.88 66 179.00 0.562 227.00 263.00 36.00 
12.02.88 67 179.00 0.000 229.00 264.00 35.00 
19.02.88 68 181.00 1.117 228.00 265.00 37.00 
26.02.88 69 183.00 1.105 228.00 266.00 38.00 
04.03.88 70 185.00 1.093 230.00 267.00 37.00 
11.03.88 71 185.00 0.000 230.00 268.00 38.00 
18.03.88 72 185.00 0.000 233.00 269.00 36.00 
25.03.88 73 185.00 0.000 234.00 270.00 36.00 
08.04.88 74 185.00 0.000 232.50 270.00 37.50 
15.04.88 75 185.00 0.000 232.00 270.00 37.50 
22.04.88 76 186.00 0.541 233.00 270.00 37.00 
29.04.88 77 186.00 0.000 232.00 270.00 38.00 
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Table A1 cont... 
Exchange Average Average Difference 
Exchange rate C:$ parallel/ parallel/ between 
Week of rate C:$ (marginal) bureau bureau SR and BR 
Date auction (marginal) % change (buying) (selling) rates 
06.05.88 78 186.00 0.000 234.00 271.00 37.00 
13.05.88 79 185.00 -0.538 234.00 271.00 37.00 
20.05.88 80 185.00 0.000 234.00 271.00 37.00 
27.05.88 81 184.00 -0.541 235.00 272.00 37.00 
03.06.88 82 185.00 0.543 236.00 272.00 36.00 
10.06.88 83 186.00 0.541 236.00 273.00 37.00 
17.06.88 84 188.00 1.075 238.00 274.00 36.00 
24.06.88 85 190.00 1.064 238.00 274.00 36.00 
08.07.88 86 193.00 1.579 239.00 274.00 35.00 
15.07.88 87 196.00 1.554 240.00 275.00 36.00 
22.07.88 88 201.00 2.551 241.00 275.00 34.00 
29.07.88 89 211.00 4.975 241.50 274.00 32.50 
05.08.88 90 215.00 1.896 243.00 275.00 32.00 
12.08.88 91 219.00 1.860 245.00 277.00 32.00 
19.08.88 92 226.00 3.196 252.00 285.00 33.00 
26.08.88 93 226.00 0.000 253.00 285.00 32.00 
02.09.88 94 228.00 0.885 258.00 290.00 32.00 
09.09.88 95 228.00 0.000 263.00 295.00 32.00 
16.09.88 96 227.00 -0.439 263.50 300.00 36.50 
23.09.88 97 227.00 0.000 264.00 305.00 41.00 
30.09.88 98 227.00 0.000 265.00 305.00 40.00 
07.10.88 99 228.00 0.441 266.00 305.00 39.00 
14.10.88 100 229.00 0.439 266.00 305.00 39.00 
21.10.88 101 229.00 0.000 271.00 310.00 39.00 
29.10.88 102 229.00 0.000 277.00 315.00 38.00 
04.11.88 103 230.00 0.437 278.00 315.00 37.00 
11.11.88 104 230.00 0.000 286.00 323.00 37.00 
18.11.88 105 231.00 0.435 296.00 333.00 37.00 
25.11.88 106 231.00 0.000 319.00 360.00 40.10 
09.12.88 108 231.00 0.000 310.00 350.00 40.00 
16.12.88 109 232.00 0.433 309.00 340.00 31.00 
23.12.88 110 230.00 -0.862 308.00 330.00 22.00 
06.01.89 111 230.00 0.000 308.00 330.00 34.00 
13.01.89 112 230.00 0.000 311.00 337.50 26.50 
20.01.89 113 230.00 0.000 318.00 347.00 29.00 
27.01.89 114 232.00 0.870 328.50 357.50 29.00 
03.02.89 115 235.00 1.293 338.00 365.00 27.00 
10.02.89 116 242.00 2.979 349.50 369.25 19.75 
17.02.89 118 258.00 6.612 352.50 373.50 21.00 
24.02.89 118 260.00 0.775 362.25 377.50 15.25 
03.03.89 119 260.00 0.000 372.00 383.50 11.50 
10.03.89 120 262.00 0.769 367.50 383.50 16.00 
17.03.89 121 262.00 0.000 370.00 382.00 12.50 
31.03.89 122 264.00 0.763 349.50 377.50 28.00 
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Table A1 cont ... 
Exchange Average Average Difference 
Exchange rate C:$ parallel/ parallel/ between 
Week of rate C:$ (marginal) bureau bureau SR and BR 
Date auction (marginal) % change (buying) (selling) rates 
07.04.89 123 264.00 0.000 330.00 372.00 42.50 
14.04.89 124 264.00 0.000 330.00 372.50 42.50 
21.04.89 125 265.00 0.379 327.50 370.00 42.50 
28.04.89 126 265.00 0.000 327.50 370.00 42.50 
05.05.89 127 266.00 0.377 326.00 370.00 44.00 
12.05.89 128 267.00 0.376 326.00 367.50 41.50 
19.05.89 129 267.00 0.000 334.00 370.00 36.00 
26.05.89 130 267.00 0.000 330.00 372.50 42.50 
02.06.89 131 268.00 0.375 350.00 370.00 20.00 
09.06.89 132 268.00 0.000 351.00 370.00 19.00 
16.06.89 133 268.00 0.000 355.00 372.50 17.50 
23.06.89 134 270.00 0.746 355.00 370.00 15.00 
30.06.89 135 270.00 0.000 361.00 370.00 9.00 
07.07.89 136 271.00 0.370 355.00 370.00 15.00 
14.07.89 137 271.00 0.000 355.00 370.00 15.00 
21.07.89 138 272.00 0.369 356.00 370.00 14.00 
28.07.89 139 273.00 0.368 356.00 370.00 14.00 
04.08.89 140 275.00 0.733 352.50 372.50 20.00 
11.08.89 141 275.00 0.000 352.50 367.50 15.00 
18.08.89 142 277.00 0.727 350.00 364.50 14.50 
25.08.89 143 277.00 0.000 350.00 365.00 15.00 
01.09.89 144 278.00 0.361 337.50 365.00 27.50 
08.09.89 145 280.00 0.719 329.00 365.00 36.00 
15.09.89 146 281.00 0.357 330.00 365.00 35.00 
22.09.89 147 282.00 0.356 330.00 367.50 37.50 
29.09.89 148 283.00 0.355 328.00 365.00 37.00 
06.10.89 149 283.00 0.000 326.00 365.00 39.00 
13.10.89 150 284.00 0.353 326.50 362.50 36.00 
20.10.89 151 286.00 0.704 327.50 362.50 35.00 
27.10.89 152 287.00 0.350 328.00 362.50 34.50 
03.11.89 153 289.00 0.697 325.00 362.50 37.50 
10.11.89 154 291.00 0.692 325.00 360.00 35.00 
17.11.89 155 294.00 1.031 327.50 357.50 30.00 
24.11.89 156 298.00 1.361 327.50 357.50 30.00 
01.12.89 157 301.00 1.007 325.00 357.50 32.50 
08.12.89 158 301.00 0.000 330.00 355.00 25.00 
15.12.89 159 303.00 0.664 335.00 352.50 17.50 
22.12.89 160 303.00 0.000 341.30 352.50 11.20 
05.01.90 161 304.00 0.330 347.50 350.00 2.50 
12.01.90 162 304.00 0.000 347.50 347.50 0.00 
19.01.90 163 306.00 0.658 347.50 360.00 12.50 
26.01.90 164 306.00 0.000 342.50 366.00 23.50 
02.02.90 165 307.00 0.327 342.50 360.00 17.50 
09.02.90 166 307.00 0.000 345.00 366.00 21.00 
15.02.90 167 308.00 0.326 336.00 355.00 19.00 
23.02.90 168 308.00 0.000 345.00 360.00 15.00 
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Exchange 
Week of rate C:$ 
Date auction (marginal) 
Exchange Average Average Difference 
rate C:$ parallel/ parallel/ between 
(marginal) bureau bureau SR and BR 
% change (buying) (selling) rates 
02.03.90 169 309.00 0.325 342.50 357.50 15.00 
09.03.90 170 310.00 0.324 350.00 357.50 7.50 
16.03.90 171 311.00 0.323 347.50 362.50 15.00 
23.03.90 172 312.00 0.322 342.50 365.00 22.50 
30.03.90 173 313.00 0.321 340.00 365.00 25.00 
06.04.90 174 314.00 0.319 340.00 365.00 25.00 
20.04.90 175 315.00 0.318 341.00 365.00 24.00 
27.04.90 176 317.00 0.635 341.00 357.50 16.50 
04.05.90 177 320.00 0.946 345.00 362.00 17.00 
11.05.90 178 322.00 0.625 347.50 360.00 12.60 
18.05.90 179 325.00 0.932 347.50 360.00 12.50 
25.05.90 180 326.00 0.308 344.80 350.00 5.20 
01.06.90 181 327.00 0.307 342.00 356.50 14.50 
08.06.90 182 327.00 0.000 341.00 356.50 15.50 
15.06.90 183 328.00 0.306 342.50 358.50 16.00 
22.06.90 184 329.00 0.305 342.50 360.00 17.50 
29.06.90 185 330.00 0,304 342.50 360.00 17.50 
06.07.90 186 330.00 0.000 343.50 360.00 16.50 
13.07.90 187 331.00 0.303 342.50 359.50 17.00 
20.07.90 188 331.00 0.000 343.50 355.00 11.50 
27.07.90 189 332.00 0.302 341.50 355.00 13.50 
03.08.90 190 332.00 0.000 340.00 355.00 15.00 
10.08.90 191 334.00 0.602 340.00 355.00 15.00 
17.08.90 192 335.00 0.299 337.50 352.50 15.00 
24.08.90 193 336.00 0.299 337.50 352.50 15.00 
31.08.90 194 337.00 0.298 338.00 351.25 13.25 
07.09.90 195 337.00 0.000 339.00 350.00 11.00 
14.09.90 196 338.00 0.297 340.00 350.00 10.00 
21.09.90 197 338.00 0.000 340.00 350.00 10.00 
29.09.90 198 339.00 0.296 336.50 350.00 13.50 
05.10.90 199 339.00 0.000 336.00 350.00 14.00 
12.10.90 200 339.00 0.000 341.00 350.00 9.00 
19.12.90 201 340.00 0.295 341.50 352.50 11.00 
26.10.90 202 342.00 0.588 341.50 351.50 10.00 
02.11.90 203 342.00 0.000 343.50 351.50 8.00 
09.11.90 204 343.00 0.292 343.00 354.00 11.00 
16.11.90 205 343.00 0.000 346.00 358.50 12.50 
23.11.90 206 344.00 0.292 345.00 355.00 10.00 
30.11.90 207 344.00 0.000 344.00 357.50 13.50 
07.12.90 208 345.00 0.291 345.00 357.50 12.50 
14.12.90 209 345.00 0.000 342.50 352.50 10.00 
21.12.90 210 345.00 0.000 337.50 356,00 18.50 
04.01.91 211 345.00 0.000 344.00 355.00 11.00 
11.01.91 212 345.00 0.000 348.00 355.00 7.00 
18.01.91 213 346.00 0.290 355.50 357.50 2.00 
25.01.91 214 346.00 0.000 358.00 369.00 11.00 
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Table A1 cont ... 
Exchange Average Average Difference 
Exchange rate C:$ parallel/ parallel/ between 
Week of rate C:$ (marginal) bureau bureau SR and BR 
Date auction (marginal) % change (buying) (selling) rates 
01.02.91 215 347.00 0.289 362.50 370.00 7.50 
08.02.91 216 349.00 0.576 368.50 376.50 8.50 
15.02.91 217 351.00 0.573 373.00 381.50 8.50 
22.02.91 218 354.00 0.855 368.50 380.00 11.50 
01.03.91 219 357.00 0.847 368.50 380.00 11.50 
08.03.91 220 359.00 0.560 373.00 381.00 8.00 
15.03.91 221 360.00 0.279 371.00 380.00 9.00 
22.03.91 222 361.00 0.278 373.00 382.50 9.50 
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Buying 
bureau/ 
Week of marginal 
Date auction ratio 
Selling Lowest Highest Difference 
bureau/ bid rate bid rate between 
marginal (LR) (HR) HR and LR 
ratio (auction) (auction) rates 
19.09.86 1 1.41 1.56 90.00 152.00 62.00 
26.09.86 2 1.33 1.48 92.00 160.00 68.00 
03.10.86 3 1.25 1.40 100.00 155.00 55.00 
10.10.86 4 1.26 1.41 141.00 160.00 19.00 
17.10.86 5 1.20 1.36 142.00 163.00 21.00 
24.10.86 6 1.23 1.39 142.00 163.00 21.00 
31.10.86 7 1.24 1.39 143.00 157.00 14.00 
07.11.86 8 1.24 1.37 146.00 158.00 12.00 
14.11.86 9 1.23 1.36 146.00 155.00 9.00 
21.11.86 10 1.21 1.35 146.00 160.00 14.00 
28.11.86 11 1.20 1.34 146.00 158.00 12.00 
05.12.86 12 1.18 1.32 145.00 157.00 12.00 
12.12.86 13 1.19 1.30 150.00 160.00 10.00 
19.12.86 14 1.20 1.32 152.00 160.00 8.00 
09.01.87 15 1.23 1.33 150.00 158.00 8.00 
16.01.87 16 1.21 1.32 150.00 158.00 8.00 
23.01.87 17 1.24 1.36 152.00 155.00 3.00 
30.01.87 18 1.23 1.42 152.00 157.00 5.00 
06.02.87 19 1.30 1.50 148.00 157.00 9.00 
13.02.87 20 1.28 1.49 148.00 158.00 10.00 
20.02.87 21 1.27 1.55. 149.00 157.00 8.00 
27.02.87 22 1.30 1.56 151.00 156.00 5.00 
13.03.87 23 1.43 1.56 150.00 158.00 8.00 
20.03.87 24 1.40 1.59 152.00 158.00 6.00 
27.03.87 25 1.41 1.60 152.00 160.00 8.00 
03.04.87 26 1.40 1.60 152.00 160.00 8.00 
10.04.87 27 1.40 1.59 152.00 160.00 8.00 
24.04.87 28 1.40 1.58 156.00 160.00 4.00 
08.05.87 29 1.38 1.57 156.00 162.00 6.00 
15.05.87 30 1.38 1.57 159.00 165.00 6.00 
22.05.87 31 1.38 1.56 159.00 163.00 4.00 
29.05.87 32 1.40 1.59 157.00 165.00 8.00 
05.06.87 33 1.41 1.60 157.00 162.00 5.00 
12.06.87 34 1.40 1.58 157.00 162.00 5.00 
19.06.87 35 1.39 1.58 158.00 164.00 6.00 
26.06.87 36 1.37 1.57 159.00 164.00 5.00 
03.07.87 37 1.37 1.57 159.00 164.00 5.00 
10.07.87 38 1.37 1.56 162.00 165.00 3.00 
17.07.87 39 1.38 1.58 162.00 170.00 8.00 
24.07.87 40 1.38 1.59 162.00 166.00 4.00 
31.07.87 41 1.38 1.59 162.00 165.00 3.00 
07.08.87 42 1.40 1.60 162.00 165.00 3.00 
14.08.87 43 1.38 1.60 163.00 165.00 2.00 
21.08.87 44 1.38 1.60 163.00 165.00 2.00 
28.08.87 45 1.37 1.61 163.00 167.00 4.00 
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Table A1 cont ... 
Buying 
bureau/ 
Week of marginal 
Date auction ratio 
Selling Lowest Highest Difference 
bureau/ bid rate bid rate between 
marginal (LR) (HR) HR and LR 
ratio (auction) (auction) rates 
04.09.87 46 1.37 1.59 163.00 168.00 5.00 
11.09.87 47 1.36 1.57 164.00 169.00 5.00 
18.09.87 48 1.34 1.54 168.00 172.00 4.00 
25.09.87 49 1.28 1.49 170.60 179.00 9.40 
02.10.87 50 1.29 1.49 175.00 191.00 16.00 
09.10.87 51 1.29 1,49 172.00 183.00 11.00 
16.10.87 52 1.29 1.49 172.00 182.00 10.00 
23.10.87 53 1.29 1.49 174.00 180.00 6.00 
30.10.87 54 1.30 1.49 174.00 182.00 8.00 
06.11.87 55 1.31 1.49 173.00 180.00 7.00 
13.11.87 56 1.29 1.49 170.00 179.00 9.00 
20.11.87 57 1.29 1.47 172.00 181.00 9.00 
27.11.87 58 1.28 1.47 170.00 170.00 0.00 
04.12.87 59 1.28 1.46 174.00 180.00 6.00 
11.12.87 60 1.27 1.46 175.00 178.00 3.00 
18.12.87 61 1.28 1.47 176.00 180.00 4.00 
08.01.88 62 1.28 1.48 176.00 180.00 4.00 
15.01.88 63 1.29 1.48 176.00 180.00 4.00 
22.01.88 64 1.28 1.49 176.00 180.00 4.00 
09.01.88 65 1.27 1.47 176.00 180.00 4.00 
05.02.88 66 1.27 1.47 177.00 181.00 4.00 
12.02.88 67 1.28 1.47 179.00 182.00 3.00 
19.02.88 68 1.26 1.46 179.00 182.00 3.00 
26.02.88 69 1.25 1.45 180.00 185.00 5.00 
04.03.88 70 1.24 1.44 183.00 186.00 3.00 
11.03.88 71 1.24 1.45 185.00 190.00 5.00 
18.03.88 72 1.26 1.45 185.00 188.00 3.00 
25.03.88 73 1.26 1.46 185.00 189.00 4.00 
08.04.88 74 1.26 1.46 185.00 189.00 4.00 
15.04.88 75 1.26 1.46 185.00 188.00 3.00 
22.04.88 76 1.25 1.45 185.00 190.00 5.00 
29.04.88 77 1.25 1.45 186.00 189.00 3.00 
06.05.88 78 1.26 1.46 186.00 189.00 3.00 
13.05.88 79 1.26 1.46 185.00 190.00 5.00 
20.05.88 80 1.26 1.46 185.00 190.00 5.00 
27.05.88 81 1.28 1.48 184.00 190.00 6.00 
03.06.88 82 1.28 1.47 184.00 188.00 4.00 
10.06.88 83 1.27 1.47 185.00 189.00 4.00 
17.06.88 84 1.27 1,46 185.00 190.00 5.00 
24.06.88 85 1.25 1.44 187.00 191.00 4.00 
08.07.88 86 1.24 1.42 189.00 195.00 6.00 
15.07.88 87 1.22 1,40 193.00 198.00 5.00 
22.07.88 88 1.20 1.37 196.00 202.00 6.00 
29.07.88 89 1.14 1.30 201.00 218.00 17.00 
05.08.88 90 1.13 1.28 211.00 240.00 29.00 
12.08.88 91 1.12 1.26 219.00 241.00 22.00 
19.08.88 92 1.12 1.26 219.00 240.00 21.00 
26.08.88 93 1.12 1.26 226.00 252.00 26.00 
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Table A2 cont ... 
Buying 
bureau/ 
Week of marginal 
Date auction ratio 
Selling Lowest Highest Difference 
bureau/ bid rate bid rate between 
marginal (LR) (HR) HR and LR 
ratio (auction) (auction) rates 
02.09.88 94 1.13 1.27 220.00 220.00 0.00 
09.09.88 95 1.15 1.29 228.00 240.00 12.00 
16.09.88 96 1.16 1.32 227.00 240.00 13.00 
23.09.88 97 1.16 1.34 227.00 242.00 15.00 
30.09.88 98 1.17 1.34 227.00 240.00 13.00 
07.10.88 99 1.17 1.34 227.00 240.00 13.00 
14.10.88 100 1.16 1.33 229.00 235.00 6.00 
21.10.88 101 1.18 1.35 229.00 235.00 6.00 
29.10.88 102 1.21 1.38 229.00 235.00 6.00 
04.11.88 103 1.21 1.37 230.00 238.00 8.00 
11.11.88 104 ; .24 1.40 230.00 235.00 5.00 
18.11.88 105 1.28 1.44 230.00 240.00 10.00 
25.11.88 106 1.35 1.51 231.00 235.00 4.00 
02.12.88 107 1.38 1.56 231.00 236.00 5.00 
09.12.88 108 1.34 1.52 229.00 237.00 8.00 
16.12.88 109 1.33 1.47 231.00 235.00 4.00 
23.12.88 110 1.34 1.43 230.00 236.00 6.00 
06.01.89 111 1.33 1.48 230.00 235.00 5.00 
13.01.89 112 1.35 1.47 230.00 235.00 5.00 
20.01.89 113 1.38 1.51 230.00 236.00 6.00 
27.01.89 114 1.42 1.54 230.00 235.00 5.00 
03.02.89 115 1.44 1.55 232.00 240.00 8.00 
10.02.89 116 1.44 1.53 235.00 246.00 11.00 
17.02.89 118 1.37 1.45 243.00 263.00 20.00 
24.02.89 118 1.39 1.45 255.00 311.00 56.00 
03.03.89 119 1.43 1.48 254.00 305.00 51.00 
10.03.89 120 1.40 1.46 262.00 300.00 38.00 
17.03.89 121 1.41 1.46 262.00 298.00 36.00 
31.03.89 122 1.32 1.43 264.00 298.00 34.00 
07.04.89 123 1.25 1.41 264.00 298.00 34.00 
14.04.89 124 1.25 1.41 264.00 295.00 31.00 
21.04.89 125 1.24 1.40 265.00 290.00 25.00 
28.04.89 12.6 1.24 1.40 265.00 290.00 25.00 
05.05.89 127 1.23 1.39 265.00 275.00 10.00 
12.05.89 128 1.22 1.38 267.00 275.00 8.00 
19.05.89 129 1.25 1.39 267.00 275.00 8.00 
26.05.89 130 1.24 1.40 267.00 280.00 13.00 
02.06.89 131 1.31 1.38 268.00 272.00 4.00 
09.06.89 132 1.31 1.38 268.00 272.00 4.00 
16.06.89 133 1.32 1.39 268.00 275.00 7.00 
23.06.89 134 1.31 1.37 269.00 275.00 6.00 
30.06.89 135 1.34 1.37 270.00 276.00 6.00 
07.07.89 136 1.31 1.37 270.00 275.00 5.00 
14.07.89 137 1.31 1.37 271.00 275.00 4.00 
21.07.89 138 1.31 1.36 271.00 281.00 10.00 
28.07.89 139 1.30 1.36 272.00 276.00 4.00 
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Table A1 cont ... 
Buying 
bureau/ 
Week of marginal 
Date auction ratio 
Selling Lowest Highest Difference 
bureau/ bid rate bid rate between 
marginal (LR) (HR) HR and LR 
ratio (auction) (auction) rates 
04.08.89 140 1.28 1.35 273.00 278.00 5.00 
11.08.89 141 1.28 1.34 275.00 281.00 6.00 
18.08.89 142 1.26 1.32 276.00 281.00 5.00 
25.08.89 143 1.26 1.32 277.00 282.00 5.00 
01.09.89 144 1.21 1.31 277.00 282.00 5.00 
08.09.89 145 1.18 1.30 278.00 284.00 6.00 
15.09.89 146 1.17 1.30 281.00 285.00 4.00 
22.09.89 147 1.17 1.30 281.00 284.00 3.00 
29.09.89 148 1.16 1.29 282.00 286.00 4.00 
06.10.89 149 1.15 1.29 283.00 286.00 3.00 
13.10.89 150 1.15 1.28 284.00 287.00 3.00 
20.10.89 151 1.15 1.27 285.00 288.00 3.00 
27.10.89 152 1.14 1.26 286.00 290.00 4.00 
03.11.89 153 1.12 1.25 288.00 292.00 4.00 
10.11.89 154 1.12 1.24 290.00 295.00 5.00 
17,11.89 155 1.11 1.22 292.00 296.00 4.00 
24.11.89 156 1.10 1.20 298.00 302.00 4.00 
01.12.89 157 1.08 1.19 300.00 308.00 8.00 
08.12.89 158 1.10 1.18 301.00 310.00 9.00 
15.12.89 159 1.11 1.16 303.00 310.00 7.00 
22.12.89 160 1.13 1.16 303.00 309.00 6.00 
05.01.90 161 1.14 1.15 304.00 310.00 6.00 
12.01.90 162 1.14 1.14 304.00 310.00 6.00 
19.01.90 163 1.14 1.18 304.00 308.00 4.00 
26.01.90 164 1.12 1.20 306.00 310.00 4.00 
02.02.90 165 1.12 1.17 307.00 310.00 3.00 
09.02.90 166 1.12 1.19 307.00 311.00 4.00 
15.02.90 167 1.09 1.15 308.00 311.00 3.00 
23.02.90 168 1.12 1.17 308.00 312.00 4.00 
02.03.90 169 1.11 1.16 308.00 311.00 3.00 
09.03.90 170 1.13 1.15 308.00 311.00 3.00 
16.03.90 171 1.12 1.17 310.00 315.00 5.00 
23.03.90 172 1.10 1.17 311.00 315.00 4.00 
30.03.90 173 1.09 1.17 312.00 315.00 3.00 
06.04.90 174 1.08 1.16 314.00 316.00 2.00 
20.04.90 175 1.08 1.16 314.00 318.00 4.00 
27.04.90 176 1.08 1.13 317.00 318.00 1.00 
04.05.90 17.7 1.08 1.13 317.00 320.00 3.00 
11.05.90 178 1.08 1.12 322.00 324.00 2.00 
18.05.90 179 1.07 1.11 323.00 325.00 2.00 
25.05.90 180 1.06 1.07 325.80 330.00 5.20 
01.06.90 161 1.05 1.09 326.00 330.00 4.00 
08.06.90 182 1.04 1.09 327.00 330.CO 3.00 
15.06.90 183 1.04 1.09 328.00 330.00 2.00 
22.06.90 184 1.04 1.09 329.00 331.00 2.00 
29.06.90 185 1.04 1.09 329.00 332.00 3.00 
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Buying 
bureau/ 
Week of marginal 
Date auction ratio 
Selling Lowest Highest Difference 
bureau/ bid rate bid rate between 
marginal (LR) (HR) HR and LR 
ratio (auction) (auction) rates 
06.07.90 186 1.04 1.09 330.00 333.00 3.00 
13.07.90 187 1.03 1.09 331.00 335.00 4.00 
20.07.90 188 1.04 1.07 331.00 334.00 3.00 
27.07.90 189 1.03 1.07 331.00 333.00 2.00 
03.08.90 190 1.02 1.07 332.00 335.00 3.00 
10.08.90 191 1.02 1.06 332.00 335.00 4.00 
17.08.90 192 1.01 1.05 334.00 336.00 2.00 
24.08.90 193 1.00 1.05 334.00 337.00 3.00 
31.08.90 194 1.00 1.04 336.00 338.00 2.00 
07.09.90 195 1.01 1.04 337.00 339.00 2.00 
14.09.90 196 1.01 1.04 337.00 340.00 3.00 
21.09.90 197 1.01 1.04 338.00 340.00 2.00 
29.09.90 198 0.99 1,03 338.00 340.00 2.00 
05.10.90 199 0.99 1.03 339.00 341.00 2.00 
12.10.90 200 1.01 1.03 339.00 341.00 2.00 
19.12.90 201 1.00 1.04 340.00 342.00 2.00 
26.10.90 202 1.00 1.03 340.00 342.00 2.00 
02.11.90 203 1.00 1.03 342.00 344.00 2.00 
09.11.90 204 1.00 1.03 342.00 344.00 2.00 
16.11.90 205 1.01 1.05 343.00 346.00 3.00 
23.11.90 206 1.00 1.03 343.00 346.00 3.00 
30.11.90 207 1.00 1.04 344.00 346.00 2.00 
07.12.90 208 1.00 1.04 345.00 346.00 1.00 
14.12.90 209 0.99 1.02 345.00 347.00 2.00 
21.12.90 210 0.98 1.03 345.00 348.00 3.00 
04.01.91 211 1.00 1.03 345.00 348,00 3.00 
11.01.91 212 1.01 1.03 345.00 348.00 3.00 
18.01.91 213 1.03 1.03 345.00 347.00 2.00 
25.01.91 214 1.03 1.07 345.00 348.00 3.00 
01.02.91 215 1.04 1.07 346.00 348.00 2.00 
08.02.91 216 1.06 1.08 349.00 350.00 1.00 
15.02.91 217 1.06 1.09 351.00 351.00 0.00 
22.02.91 218 1.04 1.07 351.00 375.00 24.00 
01.03.91 219 1.03 1.06 355.00 375.00 20.00 
08.03.91 220 1.04 1.06 359.00 375.00 16.00 
15.03.91 221 1.03 1.06 360.00 365.00 5.00 
22.03.91 222 1.03 1.06 360.00 365.00 5.00 
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Table A3 The foreign exchange auction in Ghana ill 
Date 
Supply 
of dollars 
Week of (millions) 
auction (auction) 
Demand Weekly Weekly 
for dollars Excess mean SP mean of 
(millions) demand read b/n supply 
(auction) (auction) HR and LR (million) 
19.09.86 1 2.500 7.830 -5.33 
26.09.86 2 4.000 11.952 -7.95 
03.10.86 3 6.000 12.970 -6.97 
10.10.86 4 2.360 2.460 -0.10 
17.10.86 5 2.600 4.850 -2.25 
24.10.86 6 2.500 3.100 -0.60 
31.10.86 7 1.300 2.032 -0.73 
07.11.86 8 2.636 2.886 -0.25 
14.11.86 9 1.015 1.299 -0.28 
21.11.86 10 1.720 2.080 -0.36 
28.11.86 11 1.640 3.130 -1.49 
05.12.86 12 3.660 5.830 -2.17 
12.12.86 13 1.948 4.200 -2.25 
19.12.86 14 2.630 2.630 0.00 
09.01.87 15 1.370 1.370 0.00 
16.01.87 16 2.539 3.318 -0.78 
23.01.87 17 2.245 3.055 -0.81 
30.01.87 18 2.800 3.150 -0.35 
06.02.87 19 2.457 2.457 0.00 
13.02.87 20 2.633 6.255 -3.62 
20.02.87 21 3.260 6.836 -3.58 
27.02.87 22 2.840 4.540 -1.70 
13.03.87 23 4.460 7.260 -2.80 
20.03.87 24 4.627 5.857 -1.23 
27.03.87 25 4.300 6.200 -1.90 
03.04.87 26 2.715 2.766 -0.05 
10.04.87 27 3.641 6.036 -2.39 
24.04.87 28 2.830 4.890 -2.06 
08.05.87 29 7.090 7.890 -0.80 
15.05.87 30 5.670 5.670 0.00 
22.05.87 31 3.940 4.070 -0.13 
29.05.87 32 2.530 2.530 0.00 
05.06.87 33 2.860 2.860 0.00 
12.06.87 34 3.800 5.200 -1.40 
19.06.87 35 4.140 5.070 -0.93 
26.06.87 36 2.787 6.650 -3.86 
03.07.87 37 2.960 6.020 -3.06 
10.07.87 38 5.180 7.430 -2.25 
17.07.87 39 7.198 7.198 0.00 
24.07.87 40 7.310 7.560 -0.25 
31.07.87 •41 4.209 4.209 0.00 
07.08.87 42 3.660 3.660 0.00 
14.08.87 43 5.070 5.070 0.00 
21.08.87 44 3.610 4.630 -1.02 
28.08.87 45 4.710 7.470 -2.80 
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Supply Demand Weekly Weekly 
mean of 
supply 
(million) 
of dollars for dollars Excess mean SP 
Week of (millions) (millions) demand read b/n 
Date auction (auction) (auction) (auction) HR and LR 
04.09.87 46 6.806 9.607 -2.80 
11.09.87 47 3.000 6.880 -3.88 
18.09.87 48 2.700 14.639 -11.94 
25.09.87 49 8.750 17.770 -9.02 
02.10.87 50 6.842 7.436 -0.59 
09.10.87 51 4.957 5.102 -0.15 
16.10.87 52 4.339 4.339 0.00 
23.10.87 53 3.895 3.895 0.00 
30.10.87 54 3.696 3.696 0.00 
06.11.87 55 4.675 4.675 0.00 
13.11.87 56 3.843 4.255 -0.41 
20.11.87 57 4.130 4.740 -0.61 
27.11.87 58 5.499 5.808 -0.31 
04.12.87 59 6.440 6.640 -0.20 
11.12.87 60 5.057 6.021 -0.96 
18.12.87 61 6.600 6.600 0.00 
08.01.88 62 6.157 6.157 0.00 
15.01.88 63 4.900 4.900 0.00 
22.01.88 64 5.369 5.369 0.00 
29.01.88 65 4.121 9.132 -5.01 
05.02.88 66 4.650 6.820 -2.17 
12.02.88 67 7.230 7.230 0.00 
19.02.88 68 6.895 10.330 -3.44 
26.02.88 69 5.030 10.670 -5.64 
04.03.88 70 6.600 11.100 -4.50 
11.03.88 71 6.330 6.330 0.00 
18.03.88 72 7.428 7.428 0.00 
25.03.88 73 6.720 6.720 0.00 
08.04.88 74 5.200 7.200 -2.00 
15.04.88 75 3.394 3.394 0.00 
22.04.88 76 4.037 4.144 -0.11 
29.04.88 77 4.547 4.547 0.00 
06.05.88 78 5.560 5.560 0.00 
13.05.88 79 4.415 4.415 0.00 
20.05.88 80 4.800 4.800 0.00 
27.05.88 81 4.163 4.163 0.00 
03.06.88 82 4.146 4.386 -0.24 
10.06.88 83 4.146 5.078 -0.66 
17.06.88 84 4.400 8.908 -4.51 
24.06.88 85 5.600 10.800 -5.20 
08.07.88 86 5.350 13.190 -7.84 
15.07.88 87 6.700 12.100 -5.40 
22.07.88 88 4.056 10.540 -6.48 
29.07.88 89 4.510 15.170 -10.66 
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